Justia International Trade Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Business Law
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In 1989, the Department of Commerce determined that U.S domestic industry for ball bearings was being materially injured by sales of ball bearings imported from France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Romania, Singapore, Sweden, Thailand, and the U.K. at less than fair value and published an anti-dumping order. Following four remands, the Court of International Trade’s affirmed the Commission’s decisions, issued under protest, to revoke the anti-dumping orders on ball bearings from Japan and the U.K. The Federal Circuit reversed in part and vacated in part, finding that the Commission’s second remand determination was supported substantial evidence and that the Court of International Trade erred in repeatedly remanding the case. View "NSK Corp. v.. FAG Italia, S.P.A." on Justia Law

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Kahrs imports engineered wood flooring panels for distribution to flooring wholesalers. Kahrs classified the products as “assembled parquet panels” under the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS) subheading 4418.30.00, a duty-free provision for “Builders’ joinery and carpentry of wood, including cellular wood panels and assembled parquet panels; shingles and shakes: parquet panels.” Customs subsequently liquidated Kahrs’ merchandise under HTSUS 4412, which covers “plywood, veneered panels and similar laminated wood,” at a duty rate of eight percent ad valorem. Customs denied a protest and the Court of International Trade found that Customs correctly classified Kahrs’ merchandise as plywood under heading 4412. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Kahrs Int'l, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

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This case arose from a foreign shipping contract billing dispute between Consorcio Ecuatoriano de Telecomunicaciones S.A. (CONECEL) and Jet Air Service Equador S.A. (JASE). CONECEL filed an application in the Southern District of Florida under 28 U.S.C. 1782 to obtain discovery for use in foreign proceedings in Ecuador. According to CONECEL, the foreign proceedings included both a pending arbitration brought by JASE against CONECEL for nonpayment under the contract, and contemplated civil and private criminal suits CONECEL might bring against two of its former employees who, CONECEL claims, may have violated Ecuador's collusion laws in connection with processing and approving JASE's allegedly inflated invoices. CONECEL's application sought discovery from JASE's United States counterpart, JAS Forwarding (USA), Inc. (JAS USA), which does business in Miami and was involved in the invoicing operations at issue in the dispute. The district court granted the application and authorized CONECEL to issue a subpoena. Thereafter, JASE intervened and moved to quash the subpoena and vacate the order granting the application. The district court denied the motion, as well as a subsequent motion for reconsideration. JASE appealed the denial of both. After thorough review and having had the benefit of oral argument, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the orders of the district court. the Court concluded that the panel before which which JASE and CONECEL's dispute was pending acts as a first-instance decisionmaker; it permits the gathering and submission of evidence; it resolves the dispute; it issues a binding order; and its order is subject to judicial review. The discovery statute requires nothing more. The Court also held that the district court did not abuse its considerable discretion in granting the section 1782 discovery application over JASE's objections that it would be forced to produce proprietary and confidential information. The application was narrowly tailored and primarily requested information concerning JASE's billing of CONECEL, which was undeniably at issue in the current dispute between the parties." Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying JASE's motion for reconsideration. View "In re: Application of Consorcio Ecuatoriano" on Justia Law

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Defendant, a Russian citizen, attended graduate school and owns real property, vehicles, and bank accounts in Ohio. He spends some time in Ohio each year, ranging from 40 days in 2007 to a total of 17 days in 2008–2009. He visits under a tourist visa and does not have an Ohio driver's license. After going to Russia to take part in a business venture with defendant, plaintiff filed suit in Ohio. The contract had no connection to the state. The trial court dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction, noting that defendant was not served with process in a manner that automatically confers personal jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that notions of fair play and substantial justice weigh against jurisdiction in Ohio. The court quoted a Russian proverb, “If you’re afraid of wolves, don’t go into the forest” that could be read, “If you’re afraid of the Russian legal system, don't do business in Russia.” View "Conn v. Zakharov" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs alleged that De Beers coordinated worldwide sales of diamonds by executing agreements with competitors, setting production limits, restricting resale within regions, and directing marketing, and was able to control quantity and prices by regimenting sales to preferred wholesalers. Plaintiffs claimed violations of antitrust, consumer protection, and unjust enrichment laws, and unfair business practices and false advertising. De Beers initially refused to appear, asserting lack of personal jurisdiction, but entered into a settlement with indirect purchasers that included a stipulated injunction. De Beers agreed to jurisdiction for the purpose of fulfilling terms of the settlement and enforcement of the injunction. The district court entered an order, approving the settlement and certifying a class of Indirect Purchasers in order to distribute the settlement fund and enforce the injunction. De Beers then entered into an agreement with direct purchasers that paralleled the Indirect Purchaser Settlement. The Third Circuit remanded the certification of two nationwide settlement classes as inconsistent with the predominance inquiry mandated by FRCP 23(b)(3), but, on rehearing, vacated its order. The court then affirmed the class certifications, rejecting a claim that the court was required to ensure that each class member possesses a colorable legal claim. The settlement was fair, reasonable, and adequate. View "Sullivan v. DB Inv., Inc." on Justia Law

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The companies are direct competitors in importing and distributing pharmaceutical ingredients manufactured in China. Plaintiff claimed that defendant intentionally interfered with one of its contracts and sought damages. In court-ordered settlement negotiations, plaintiff demanded $675,000. Defendant made a counter-offer, demanding that plaintiff pay it $444,444.44 in order to settle the case and avoid a motion for sanctions and a suit for malicious prosecution. The court noted that the peculiar amount was due to the fact that the number four is considered an unlucky number in Chinese culture because it is homophonous with the Chinese word for death, but concluded that it was not a death threat and declined to impose sanctions. The court later entered summary judgment for defendant. The First Circuit affirmed the court's refusal to impose sanctions under FRCP 11. Plaintiff's claims were not patently frivolous. View "CQ Int'l Co., Inc. v. Rochem Int'l, Inc., USA" on Justia Law

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Polysilicon producer MEMC entered in exclusive sales representation agreements with Semi-Materials. Under these agreements, Semi-Materials was to serve as the sales representative for MEMC in China and Korea. Semi-Materials brought suit against MEMC, claiming it was entitled to certain commissions. The court held that, considering the four corners of the agreements at issue, the court could not agree with the district court's conclusion that the agreements clearly and unambiguously limited Semi-Materials to receiving commissions only on those sales which included terms whereby the risk of loss remained with MEMC until the product entered China or South Korea. Because the meaning and intent of that language was uncertain and subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, it was necessary to reverse the grant of partial summary judgment and remand this matter to the district court for trial. The court also held that the evidence presented to the jury at trial supported its finding that MEMC clothed a sales manager with the authority to enter into the agreements with Semi-Materials. Accordingly, MEMC could not show there were no probative facts presented at trial supporting the jury's determination that Semi-Materials reasonably relied upon the sales manager's apparent authority to enter into the agreements. Moreover, the court rejected MEMC's argument that Semi-Materials failed to perform a material obligation to the contracts to provide regular reports to MEMC. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's grant of partial summary judgment for MEMC and affirmed its denial of MEMC's judgment as a matter of law. View "Semi-Materials Co., Ltd, et al. v. MEMC Electronic Materials, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff, a resident of Nevada, negotiated an oral contract with defendant, a citizen and resident of Israel. Defendant worked for one of plaintiff's companies, a Delaware corporation with offices in Massachusetts and Israel, from 1996-2000 and claimed that the agreement entitled him to a 12 percent investment in plaintiff's casino venture. Plaintiff claimed that defendant was entitled to 12 percent of net from high-tech sector investments recommended by defendant and filed a declaratory judgment action. On remand after reversal of dismissal for forum non conveniens, the district court ruled in favor of plaintiff. The First Circuit affirmed, first holding that defendant's contacts with Massachusetts were sufficient for jurisdiction. The district court properly placed the burden of proof on defendant, the natural plaintiff who would have had the burden of proving his affirmative claim to the 12 percent option in a damages action; the burden of proof was, nonetheless, not dispositive. The record supported the finding that there was no meeting of minds on the option. View "Adelson v. Hananel" on Justia Law

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An anti-dumping petition claimed that Chinese firms were exporting frontseating service valves at less than fair value. The Department of Commerce calculated normal value of the valves by using India as a surrogate market economy and identifying brass bars as a primary raw material; it valued the labor factor of production using regression analysis that included wage rates and gross national income data from sixty-one market economy countries. Commerce issued a final determination that calculated the surrogate value for brass bar without excluding the imports from Japan, France, and the UAE. The Court of International Trade upheld the determination. The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded for revaluation of labor, not using the regression approach, and reconsideration of sales at issue for calculating the relevant total dumping margin. Commerce’s reading of the evidence was reasonable in including data on imports from Japan, France, and the UAE, to calculate the surrogate value of brass bar. View "Zhejiang Dunan Hetian Metal Co., Ltd. v. United States" on Justia Law

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In November 2001, the U.S. Department of Commerce issued an anti-dumping duty order on certain hot-rolled carbon steel flat products from Thailand, found that the company was selling the subject merchandise at less than normal value and assigned a dumping margin of 3.86%. In 2006 the order was partially revoked, as to the company, but remained in effect with respect to other exporters and producers. Commerce received a complaint that dumping had resumed and initiated changed circumstances review (CCR), despite the company's assertion that it lacked authority to so. The Court of International Trade (CIT) dismissed the company's suit for an injunction in 2009. Commerce reinstated the order with respect to the company; CIT affirmed. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that Commerce reasonably interpreted and acted on its revocation and CCR authority under 19 U.S.C. 1675(b, d) as permitting conditional revocation and reconsideration. View "Sahaviriya Steel Ind. Public Co.Ltd. v. United States" on Justia Law