Justia International Trade Opinion Summaries

Following a 1996 investigation, the Department of Commerce declared that freshwater crawfish tail meat imported from China was subject to antidumping duties. In 2001, JCOF imported that product from Yangzhou, which qualified as a “new exporter” under 19 U.S.C. 1675(a)(2)(B). JCOF obtained, from AHAC , a one-year, continuous $600,000 bond, 19 U.S.C. 1675(a)(2)(B)(iii), made two entries from Yangzhou, and declared a 0% duty rate, the deposit rate then in effect for shipments by Yangzhou. Commerce conducted administrative review of 2001-2002 entries; the final results assigned Yangzhou a 223.01% rate. Customs liquidated the entries and billed JCOF, which failed to pay. Customs sought payment from AHAC, which filed protest. Another exporter challenged Commerce’s 2004 administrative review. Following dissolution of a resultant injunction, which had not applied to Yangzhou, Customs nonetheless reliquidated JCOF’s entries, issued new bills, and denied AHAC’s protest. AHAC did not appeal, but filed another protest, which was denied. Customs demanded $1,157,898.22. AHAC asserted that the collection action was moot because the erroneous reliquidations voided the previous liquidations, so that no valid liquidation occurred and the entries should be deemed liquidated under 19 U.S.C. 1504(d) at the initially-declared 0% rate. The Court of International Trade and Federal Circuit held that AHAC was obligated to pay. The reliquidations voided the original liquidations, but AHAC failed to preserve its rights by timely litigation; the reliquidations became final, “whether legal or not.” The court remanded the issues of equitable and statutory prejudgment interest. View "United States v. Am. Home Assurance Co." on Justia Law

Best, a Hong Kong manufacturer, produces Metalized Yarn from polyester chips melted with metal nanopowders to form monofilament yarns. Best sought a pre-importation ruling concerning proper tariff classification in the Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTSUS), attaching a laboratory report describing the yarn as having a fiber content of 100% polyester, with 0.7%- 0.74% metal by weight. Customs classified the yarn as metalized yarn, HTSUS 5605.00.90, dutiable at 13.2%, stating “yarn combined with metal in the form of powder is considered a metalized yarn.” Best then sought a ruing regarding a “Johnny Collar” garment made of its yarn, asserting the garment was classifiable under HTSUS 6105.90.8030 as a shirt of other textile materials (duty rate 5.6%), not HTSUS 6110.30.3053 for polyester shirts (duty rate 32%). Based on trace amounts of metal and a label that stated “100% polyester,” Customs classified the sample as man-made non-metalized fibers under HTSUS 6110.30.3053. Customs subsequently revoked the Yarn Ruling, reclassifying the yarn as a polyester yarn under HTSUS 5402.47.90 (duty rate 8%). Customs also revoked the Johnny Collar Ruling as conflicting with the Yarn Ruling, but continued to classify the garment under 6110.30.30. Best challenged the Yarn Ruling Revocation, but not the Johnny Collar revocation. The Trade Court sustained the Revocation. The Federal Circuit vacated with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Best sought reversal of a Revocation, the effect of which would be to increase Best ’s own duty rate while benefiting manufacturers of products made from its yarn. The statute does not provide jurisdiction over such requests View "Best Key Textiles Co., Ltd. v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2008, plaintiffs were driving a 2004 Jeep Cherokee in San Joaquin County, when the vehicle rolled over and the roof collapsed. Young sustained injuries, rendering her a permanent quadriplegic. Young’s daughter allegedly suffered physical and emotional harm. They filed suit, claiming that the roof and restraint systems were defectively designed. The vehicle at issue was designed, manufactured, and distributed by DaimlerChrysler Corporation (DCC), a former indirect subsidiary of Daimler. Among others, the complaint named Daimler and DCC as defendants. Daimler is a German public stock company that designs and manufactures Mercedes-Benz vehicles in Germany and has its principal place of business in Stuttgart. Before 1998, DCC was known as Chrysler Corporation. After a 1998 agreement, Chrysler Corporation became an indirect subsidiary of Daimler and changed its name to DCC. DCC was a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Michigan. It ceased to be a subsidiary of Daimler in 2007, changing its name to Chrysler LLC. Daimler is not a successor-in-interest to DCC or Chrysler LLC. Plaintiffs served Daimler with the complaint in accordance with the Hague Convention. The trial court quashed service for lack of personal jurisdiction over Daimler AG. The court of appeal affirmed, relying on the 2014 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Daimler AG v. Bauman. View "Young v. Daimler AG" on Justia Law

Fellowes filed a breach-of-contract suit against Changzou Fellowes, a business established in China, under the international diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. 1332(a)(2). Without discussing subject-matter jurisdiction, the district court entered a preliminary injunction in favor of Fellowes, despite the court’s assumption that Changzhou Fellowes had not been served with process. The Seventh Circuit vacated, reasoning that diversity jurisdiction is proper only if Changzhou Fellowes has its own citizenship, independent of its investors or members. Deciding whether a business enterprise based in a foreign nation should be treated as a corporation for the purpose of section 1332 can be difficult. Given the parties’ agreement that Changzhou Fellowes is closer to a limited liability company than to any other business structure in the U.S., it does not have its own citizenship and it does have the Illinois citizenship of its member Hong Kong Fellowes, which prevents litigation under the diversity jurisdiction. View "Fellowes Inc. v. Changzhou Xinrui Fellowes Office Equip. Co." on Justia Law

Idento makes robotic milking machines in the Netherlands. BouMatic, LLC, based in Wisconsin, entered into an agreement for purchasing and reselling those machines in Belgium. BouMatic claims that Idento breached the agreement by selling direct to at least one of BouMatic’s Belgian customers and by failing to provide parts and warranty service. The district court dismissed, ruling that commercial transactions in the European Union do not expose Idento to litigation in Wisconsin even though BouMatic has its headquarters there, the parties exchanged drafts between Wisconsin and the Netherlands, and Idento shipped one machine to Wisconsin. After exploring the nature of the business entities, the Seventh Circuit vacated for consideration of personal jurisdiction in light of the contract language. Litigants cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction by agreement or omission, but personal jurisdiction is a personal right that a litigant may waive or forfeit. View "BouMatic LLC v. Idento Operations BV" on Justia Law

After the Republic of Argentina defaulted on its external debt, NML, one of its bondholders, prevailed in 11 debt-collection actions filed against Argentina in New York. To execute its judgments, NML sought discovery of Argentina’s property, serving subpoenas on nonparty banks for records relating to global financial transactions. The district court granted motions to compel compliance. The Second Circuit affirmed, rejecting Argentina’s argument that the order transgressed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1330, 1602. The Supreme Court affirmed; the FSIA does not immunize a foreign-sovereign judgment debtor from post-judgment discovery of information concerning its extraterritorial assets. The FSIA replaced factor-intensive loosely-common-law-based immunity with “a comprehensive framework for resolving any claim of sovereign immunity” so that any sort of immunity defense made by a foreign sovereign in a U.S. court must stand or fall on its text. The FSIA established jurisdictional immunity, section 1604, which was waived here. FSIA execution immunity under sections 1609, 1610, 1611, generally shields “property in the United States of a foreign state” from attachment, arrest, and execution. Nothing forbids or limits discovery in aid of execution of a foreign-sovereign judgment debtor’s assets. Even if Argentina is correct that section 1609 execution immunity implies coextensive discovery-¬in-aid-of-execution immunity, there would be no protection from discovery a foreign sovereign’s extraterritorial assets. Section 1609 immunizes only foreign-state property “in the United States.” The prospect that NML’s general request for information about Argentina’s worldwide assets may turn up information about property that Argentina regards as immune does not mean that NML cannot pursue its discovery. View "Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd." on Justia Law

After the Republic of Argentina defaulted on its external debt, NML, one of its bondholders, prevailed in 11 debt-collection actions filed against Argentina in New York. To execute its judgments, NML sought discovery of Argentina’s property, serving subpoenas on nonparty banks for records relating to global financial transactions. The district court granted motions to compel compliance. The Second Circuit affirmed, rejecting Argentina’s argument that the order transgressed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1330, 1602. The Supreme Court affirmed; the FSIA does not immunize a foreign-sovereign judgment debtor from post-judgment discovery of information concerning its extraterritorial assets. The FSIA replaced factor-intensive loosely-common-law-based immunity with “a comprehensive framework for resolving any claim of sovereign immunity” so that any sort of immunity defense made by a foreign sovereign in a U.S. court must stand or fall on its text. The FSIA established jurisdictional immunity, section 1604, which was waived here. FSIA execution immunity under sections 1609, 1610, 1611, generally shields “property in the United States of a foreign state” from attachment, arrest, and execution. Nothing forbids or limits discovery in aid of execution of a foreign-sovereign judgment debtor’s assets. Even if Argentina is correct that section 1609 execution immunity implies coextensive discovery-¬in-aid-of-execution immunity, there would be no protection from discovery a foreign sovereign’s extraterritorial assets. Section 1609 immunizes only foreign-state property “in the United States.” The prospect that NML’s general request for information about Argentina’s worldwide assets may turn up information about property that Argentina regards as immune does not mean that NML cannot pursue its discovery. View "Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd." on Justia Law