Justia International Trade Opinion Summaries

Motorola and its foreign subsidiaries buy LCD panels and incorporate them into cellphones. They alleged that foreign LCD panel manufacturers violated section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, by fixing prices. Only about one percent of the panels were bought by Motorola in the U.S. The other 99 percent were bought by, paid for, and delivered to foreign subsidiaries; 42 percent of the panels were bought by subsidiaries and incorporated into products that were shipped to Motorola in the U.S. for resale. The other 57 percent were incorporated into products that were sold abroad and never became U.S. domestic commerce, subject to the Sherman Act. The district judge ruled that Motorola’s claim regarding the 42 percent was barred by 15 U.S.C. 6a(1)(A): the Act “shall not apply to conduct involving trade or commerce (other than import trade or import commerce) with foreign nations unless such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with foreign nations, or on import trade or import commerce with foreign nations.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that rampant extraterritorial application of U.S. law “creates a serious risk of interference with a foreign nation’s ability independently to regulate its own commercial affairs.” View "Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp." on Justia Law

Corning hired Hyundai, an ocean shipper, to transport thin glass sheets for use in televisions and computer monitors from the U.S. to Asia. Although it is not clear when the damage occurred, damage was noted when Hyundai unloaded the containers from flatcars operated by its subcontractors (Norfolk Southern Railway and BNSF, another rail carrier). Corning had no role in selecting and no relationship with the subcontractors. There were opinions that the damage was caused by movement of the railcars, not by packing, but the actual cause was not established. Corning’s insurer paid Corning $664,679.88 and filed suit. The district court held that the case would proceed solely under the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. 11706, apparently reasoning that the damage undisputedly occurred while the cargo was in the possession of a rail carrier. The court found that a Subcontracting Clause did not immunize the rail carriers from suit, but obligated Corning to indemnify Hyundai for any resultant claims by a subcontractor against Hyundai arising out of the same facts. The court held that a $500-per-package limit of liability did not apply to the rail carriers or Hyundai. After a jury trial, the court found Hyundai and the railroads liable, but denied prejudgment interest. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the judgment against Hyundai, reversed and vacated judgments against the railroads, and remanded for reconsideration of prejudgment interest.View "CNA Ins. Co. v. Hyundai Merch. Marine Co., Ltd." on Justia Law

The Tariff Act of 1930 permits the Department of Commerce to impose two types of duties on imports that injure domestic industries: antidumping duties on goods sold in the U.S. "at less than ... fair value,” 19 U.S.C. 1673 and countervailing duties on goods that receive “a countervailable subsidy” from a foreign government, 1671(a). Commerce has long collected both types of duties from market economy importers. In 2012, Congress enacted legislation that overruled the Federal Circuit’s 2011 decision, GPXI, and permitted imposition of both antidumping and countervailing duties with respect to importers from non-market economy (NME) countries. Because this law is retroactive and does not require Commerce to adjust for any double counting that may result from the retroactive imposition of both countervailing and antidumping duties, Wireking, an importer affected by the change, claimed that it violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of Article I, Section 9 of the U.S. Constitution. The Court of International Trade upheld the new law. The Federal Circuit affirmed. Wireking did not show that the absence of a retrospective double-counting provision negates the law’s predominantly remedial impact. The 2012 law is not punitive and does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. View "Guangdong Wireking Housewares v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2005, the Department of Commerce issued an antidumping duty order on wooden bedroom furniture from China; importers who were not individually investigated are required to post a deposit at a country-wide rate of 216.01%. Marvin, a Chinese furniture producer and exporter, did not export subject merchandise during the investigation period. In 2011, Marvin requested new shipper review to obtain an individual rate and avoid the country-wide rate. Based on U.S. Customs and Border Protection data, Commerce determined that Marvin’s exports had entered the U.S. in 2010. Marvin explained that the entries contained only non-subject merchandise samples for a trade show with no offers for sale. Commerce accepted Marvin’s explanation and initiated new shipper review covering Marvin’s exports entered from January 1 through June 30, 2011. Marvin later submitted information that the 2010 entries included some subject merchandise, entered for consumption, contrary to its initial request. In 2012, Commerce preliminarily rescinded Marvin’s new shipper review. Marvin argued harmless and unintentional error that did not affect new shipper review eligibility. Commerce finalized the rescission, citing19 C.F.R. 351.214(b)(2)(iv)(A) and (B). The Trade Court affirmed, holding that 19 U.S.C. 1677m, which allows a party to correct filings, was inapplicable because Marvin’s request for a new shipper review was not filed in “response to a request for information” under the statute. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Marvin Furniture Co., Ltd. v. United States" on Justia Law

LSI imported beef jerky products consisting of sliced, cooked, cured, and dried meat seasoned with salt and other spices and flavors from New Zealand and Brazil. The manufacturing process for the imported jerky involves curing the sliced boneless beef in a mixture of seasoning, sodium nitrate, and water for 24 to 48 hours, after which the meat is cooked and smoked for several hours. In airtight bags, the product has a shelf life of 18–20 months. U.S. Customs and Border Protection classified the subject beef jerky under Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the U.S. (HTSUS) subheading 1602.50.09 as “cured” prepared or preserved beef and denied LSI’s protests to classify it under subheading 1602.50.2040 as “other” prepared or preserved beef. LSI filed suit in the Court of International Trade, which granted the government summary judgment. The court considered LSI’s arguments that beef jerky is defined more by its dehydrated properties than by the curing process, but found that subheading 1602.50.09 included all forms of the named article, even improved forms. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Link Snacks, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

After receiving petitions from the Coalition, the U.S. Department of Commerce initiated antidumping (19 U.S.C. 1673) and countervailing duty (19 U.S.C. 1671) investigations covering utility scale wind towers from China and an antidumping investigation covering Vietnam. The U.S. International Trade Commission issued a preliminary determination that there was a reasonable indication of threat of material injury to a domestic industry by reason of the imports. Commerce issued a preliminary affirmative countervailing duty determination with respect to imports from China and preliminary affirmative antidumping duty determinations with respect to imports from China and Vietnam. Commerce instructed Customs and Border Protection to suspend liquidation of all entries of the subject merchandise and require cash deposits for the entries. Commerce then made final affirmative determinations. ITC issued a final affirmative determination in an evenly-divided vote, but of the six Commissioners on the panel, three found neither material injury nor threat of injury, two determined that the industry had suffered present material injury, and a third determined that the domestic industry was threatened with material injury, but that the domestic industry would not have suffered material injury in the absence of the provisional measures. Commerce then issued antidumping and countervailing duty orders. Commerce applied the “Special Rule,” 19 U.S.C. 1671e(b)(2) and 1673e(b)(2), making the orders effective prospectively from the publication of the ITC Determination. The orders indicated that Commerce would instruct Customs to terminate the suspension of liquidation and refund deposits made before the publication date of the ITC Determination. The Court of International Trade denied the Coalition’s motions for injunctions. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Wind Tower Trade Coal. v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2008, the U.S. Department of Commerce found that woven laminated sacks exported from China were being sold in the U.S. at less than fair market value and issued an antidumping duty order under 19 U.S.C. 1673. In 2009, Commerce initiated administrative review of that order for periods, during which AMS had imported sacks made from fabric sourced in China, undisputedly subject to the order; and sacks made from fabric imported into China from other countries. Commerce investigated, but did not initiate formal scope inquiry. AMS argued that a ruling obtained from U.S. Customs and Border Protection provided that the sacks produced from non-Chinese fabric were deemed to be from the country of origin of the fabric, not subject to the order and declared a non-Chinese origin for sacks made with non-Chinese fabric. Commerce concluded that China was the country of origin of sacks made with non-Chinese fabric under a substantial transformation analysis, then issued a “clarification” of its instructions to Customs to “suspend liquidation of all [laminated woven sacks] from [China], regardless of the origin of the woven fabric,… on or after January 31, 2008.” The Trade Court sustained application of a country-wide rate; the Federal Circuit affirmed. Following a second administrative review, the trade court held that Commerce violated its own regulations by instructing Customs to retroactively suspend liquidation of entries of the sacks made with non-Chinese fabric The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "AMS Assocs, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Cross Match claimed that Suprema and Mentalix violated 19 U.S.C. 1337(a)(1)(B)(i) by importing articles that infringe or are used to infringe its patents. The International Trade Commission entered a limited exclusion order barring importation of certain optical scanning devices, finding that Mentalix directly infringed a method claim by using its own software with imported Suprema scanners and found that Suprema induced that infringement and that certain of Suprema’s imported optical scanners directly infringe other claims of the 993 patent. The Commission found no infringement of the 562 patent. The Commission held that Suprema and Mentalix failed to prove that the 993 patent was invalid as obvious over two prior art patents. The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded for revision of the order to bar only a subset of the scanners. An exclusion order based on a section 1337(a)(1)(B)(i) violation may not be predicated on a theory of induced infringement under 35 U.S.C. 271(b) where direct infringement does not occur until after importation of the articles the exclusion order would bar. View "Suprema, inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n" on Justia Law

Wilton imported 39 models of paper punches from Taiwan for use in scrapbooking and craft projects, to cut paper in a variety of shapes and sizes. Except for one model, U.S. Customs and Border Protection initially liquidated the punches under Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the U.S. (HTSUS) subheading 8203.40.60 as “perforating punches and similar handtools” with a duty margin of 3.3%. Customs denied Wilton’s protests to classify them under the duty free HTSUS subheading 8441.10.00 as “cutting machines of all kinds.” The parties entered into a stipulation agreement to classify 23 models under subheading 8441.10.00 because they were too large to use in the hand. Customs maintained that subheading 8203.40.60 was proper for the 16 models that remained in dispute because they were “intended for use when held in the hand.” The U.S. Court of International Trade granted the government summary judgment, setting aside the stipulation and finding that the punches “prima facie fall under Heading 8203 as a perforating punch.” The Federal Circuit affirmed; the articles at issue are described eo nomine by HTSUS Heading 8203.40 View "Wilton Indus., Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2010, Microsoft filed a complaint in the U.S. International Trade Commission, alleging that Motorola had violated the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. 1337, by importing mobile phones and tablets that infringe several Microsoft patents. The Commission instituted an investigation and, after an evidentiary hearing, the ALJ found that the accused Motorola products did not infringe the 054, 762, 376, or 133 patents and that Microsoft had failed to prove that the mobile devices on which it relied actually implemented those patents. The Commission upheld the ALJ’s findings, finding that Microsoft failed to prove that the Microsoft-supported products on which it relied for its domestic-industry showing actually practiced the patents. The Federal Circuit reversed in part, first affirming that Motorola does not infringe the 054 patent and that Microsoft failed to prove that a domestic industry exists for products protected by the 762 and 376 patents. With respect to the 133 patent the Commission relied on incorrect claim constructions in finding no infringement, the only basis for its finding no violation, for the main group of accused products. The court affirmed the noninfringement finding for the accused alternative design. View "Microsoft Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n" on Justia Law