Justia International Trade Opinion Summaries

Four persons were charged with arranging the murder of “Montes” in Mexico to reduce competition against a Chicago-based criminal organization that created bogus immigration documents. The Seventh Circuit reversed dismissal on grounds that the indictment proposed the extraterritorial application of U.S. law. On remand, one defendant pleaded guilty. Three were convicted under 18 U.S.C. 1959, the Racketeer​ Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); 18 U.S.C. 956(a)(1), which forbids any person “within the jurisdiction of the United States” from conspiring to commit a murder abroad; and conspiring to produce false identification documents, 18 U.S.C. 371. On appeal, defendants cited the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision, Morrison v. National Australia Bank, which reiterated the presumption against extraterritorial application of civil statutes. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that its earlier decision recognized that presumption and thought it not controlling, because of the differences between criminal and civil law, and because the murder in Mexico was arranged and paid for from the U.S., and was committed with the goal of protecting a criminal organization that conducted business in the U.S., to defraud U.S. officials and employers. View "United States v. Leija-Sanchez" on Justia Law

In 2007, the Department of Commerce investigated imports of “certain activated carbon” from China by the largest volume exporters, Jacobi and CCT. Commerce determined that Huahui and Cherishmet and Shanxi were entitled to separate rates. In its third and final review in 2011, Commerce individually examined Jacobi and CCT. Cherishmet, Shanxi, and Huahui were assigned a separate rate. Huahui unsuccessfully requested individual examination as a voluntary respondent. Commerce determined that Jacobi and CCT, the individually examined respondents, were not dumping, and assigned them de minimis margins. Under 19 U.S.C. 1673d(c)(5), when all individually examined exporters are assigned de minimis margins, the “expected method” is to calculate the separate rate by taking the average of the de minimis margins assigned to the individually examined respondents. If following the expected method would not be feasible or would result in margins that would “not be reasonably reflective of potential dumping margins” for the separate respondents, Commerce may use “other reasonable methods.” Commerce determined that the expected method would result in margins that would not be "reasonably reflective" and calculated separate rates for Huahui, Cherishmet, and Shanxi, continuing to apply previously-assigned margins. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Trade Court in part, holding that Commerce’s use of prior margins was impermissible. Commerce failed to justify using the rate from the prior administrative review. View "Albemarle Corp. v. United States" on Justia Law

In antidumping proceedings involving nonmarket economy countries, such as China, the Tariff Act requires the Department of Commerce to calculate normal value of the subject merchandise based on surrogate values offered in a comparable market economy, 19 U.S.C. 1677b(c)(1). Commerce calculates the surrogate values by valuing certain “factors of production” used in producing the merchandise in a comparable market economy, essentially creating a hypothetical normal value for the merchandise that is uninfluenced by the nonmarket economy. In review of an anti-dumping duty order on certain steel threaded rod from China, Commerce selected Thailand as the surrogate country for China to value certain factors of production in calculating normal value for the subject merchandise. The Court of International Trade and the Federal Circuit affirmed, finding the decision in accordance with law, not arbitrary or capricious, and supported by substantial evidence. The court rejected an argument that Commerce was bound by its past practice of using India as a surrogate. View "Jiaxing Bros. Fastener Co. v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2001, U.S. producers filed an antidumping petition against imports of steel wire rod of at least 5.00 mm diameter,stating “[m]ost of the industrial quality wire rod is produced and sold in 7/32 inch (5.5 mm) diameter, which is also the smallest cross-sectional diameter that is hot-rolled in significant commercial quantities.” The ITC issued a “material injury” determination for product “of approximately round cross section, 5.00 mm or more, but less than 19.00 mm.” The Department of Commerce issued an antidumping duty order on imports from six countries, covering product with a diameter of “5.00 mm or more, but less than 19.00 mm.” After the order issued, Mexican companies manufactured and imported into the U.S. steel wire rod within a diameter of 4.75 mm. U.S. producers requested that Commerce investigate under 19 U.S.C. 1677. Commerce determined that 4.75 to 5.00 mm steel wire rod was a minor alteration of the subject merchandise and that its import constituted an affirmative circumvention of the order. The Trade Court remanded based on the literal scope of the order, finding the product was “commercially available” at the time of the original investigation. On remand, Commerce issued a redetermination of negative circumvention. The Trade Court remanded again, instructing Commerce to consider revisiting whether small-diameter rod was commercially available before issuance of the order. Commerce declined to do so. The Trade Court affirmed the negative circumvention determination. The Federal Circuit reversed: Commerce’s initial minor alteration determination was supported by substantial evidence. View "Deacero S.A. DE C.V. v. United States" on Justia Law

A guest at Ohio social gathering, Grimm, brought a rifle and ammunition to the Sunbury house, where he assembled and invited guests to shoot. At Grimm's direction, Rote loaded the rifle; before the bolt moved into a closed-and-secured position, the round exploded and a “loud sound” was heard. Rote sustained severe damage to his right hand. The round that exploded came from a box bearing marks identifying it as being manufactured by DGFM. The allegedly defective ammunition was purchased online through a New Jersey-based company. Rote and his wife filed a negligence and products-liability suit against several defendants, including DGFM. DGFM argued that, as an instrumentality of the Republic of Argentina, it is immune from suit under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. 1602. The district court denied its motion to dismiss, finding that the “commercial activity” exception to the Act applies. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that the design and manufacture of a product constitutes a “commercial activity” under the FSIA and that a court need not find that a foreign state has minimum contacts with the United States in order to conclude that the state’s acts have a direct effect here. View "Rote v. Zel Custom Mfg., LLC" on Justia Law

JBLU does business as C’est Toi Jeans USA. In 2010, JBLU imported jeans manufactured in China, embroidered with “C’est Toi Jeans USA,” “CT Jeans USA,” or “C’est Toi Jeans Los Angeles” in various fonts. JBLU filed trademark applications for “C’est Toi Jeans USA” and “CT Jeans USA” on October 8, 2010, stating that the marks had been used in commerce since 2005. Customs inspected the jeans and found violation of the Tariff Act, which requires that imported articles be marked with their country of origin, 19 U.S.C. 1304(a); JBLU’s jeans were marked with “USA” and “Los Angeles,” but small-font “Made in China” labels were not in close proximity to and of at least the same size as “USA” and “Los Angeles.” Customs applied more lenient requirements to the jeans that were marked with “C’est Toi Jeans USA” or “CT Jeans USA” and were imported after JBLU filed its trademark applications. The Trade Court granted the government summary judgment. The Federal Circuit reversed, finding that the more-lenient requirements apply to unregistered, as well as registered, trademarks. Regulations in the same chapter as 19 C.F.R. 134.47 and regulations in a different chapter but the same title use the word “trademark” to include registered and unregistered trademarks. View "JBLU, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2004-2005, Ford imported Jaguar-brand cars from the UK into the U.S. and deposited estimated duty payments. Ford later concluded that its estimates had been too high and filed nine reconciliation entries, seeking a refund of about $6.2 million. Customs may liquidate an entry within one year after filing, 19 U.S.C. 1504(a). It may extend that period if it needs additional information or if the importer requests an extension, for a maximum of three one-year extensions. Otherwise the entry “shall be deemed liquidated at the rate ... asserted by the importer.” When an entry is deemed liquidated, Customs may not recalculate the duty owed. Ford asserted the rate in its reconciliation entries rather than the rate asserted at the time of entry. Ford sought a declaratory judgment that its entries had been liquidated as a matter of law in 2009. The Court of International Trade dismissed some claims as barred by the statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. 2636(i) and declined to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction over the remaining claims. The Federal Circuit affirmed, declining to address the statute of limitations and noting that all of Ford’s entries have now liquidated; Customs denied the protest for Ford’s 2005 entries, and Ford has filed a section 1581(a) challenge. View "Ford Motor Co. v. United States" on Justia Law

The shipper petitioner appealed the district court's order confirming an arbitration award and award of attorney's fees and costs to the respondent carrier. The court concluded that the shipper has not established any ground for vacating the arbitral award. The court rejected the shipper's argument that the arbitral panel manifestly disregarded the substantive law of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA), 46 U.S.C. 30701, and the shipper's argument that the panel chairman was guilty of corruption or misbehavior because he failed to disclose his illness to the parties. The court affirmed the district court's order confirming the arbitration award. The court concluded, however, that there was no finding that the petitioner shipper breached the charter agreement. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's award of attorney's fees and costs. View "Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Team Tankers A.S." on Justia Law

VLM, a Montreal-based supplier, sold frozen potatoes to IT in Illinois. After nine successful transactions, IT encountered financial difficulty and failed to pay for the next nine shipments. Invoices sent after delivery included a provision purporting to make IT liable for collection-related attorney’s fees if it breached the contracts. VLM sued; the deadline for an answer passed. The court entered a default. On defendants' motion, the court vacated the default as to IT’s president only. All three defendants then filed answers, contesting liability for attorney’s fees. The judge applied the Illinois Uniform Commercial Code and found that the fee provision had been incorporated into the contract. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods applied. On remand, the judge applied the Convention and held that the fee provision was not part of the contracts and that IT could benefit from this ruling, despite the prior entry of default. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. IT never expressly assented to the attorney’s fees provision in VLM’s trailing invoices, so under the Convention that term did not become a part of the contracts. VLM waived its right to rely on the default by failing to raise the issue until its reply brief on remand. View "VLM Food Trading Int'l, Inc. v. Ill. Trading Co." on Justia Law

In 2002, the Department of Commerce published notice of an antidumping duty order covering polyethylene terephthalate film, sheet, and strip (PET Film) from Taiwan, Commerce initiated administrative review in 2010, covering three respondents, including Nan Ya and Shinkong. Without providing a reason, Nan Ya informed Commerce that it would not participate in the review; it submitted no information. Commerce determined that Nan Ya significantly impeded the proceeding, applied an adverse inference to Nan Ya in selecting among the facts available, and assigned a 74.34% rate to Nan Ya. The Court of International Trade sustained Commerce’s determination. The Federal Circuit affirmed. Under 19 U.S.C. 1677e(b)(4), Commerce may assign the highest transaction-specific margin on the record of the subject review. If Commerce selects the highest transaction-specific margin from the subject review from among the adverse facts available, it need not corroborate that information. Congress has confirmed there that Commerce has the “discretion to apply [the] highest rate” and need not demonstrate that a particular dumping margin “reflects an alleged commercial reality of the interested party,=” in the Trade Preferences Extension Act of 2015. View "Nan Ya Plastics Corp. v. United States" on Justia Law