Justia International Trade Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in International Trade
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Ford imported automotive goods and paid duties. Ford later claimed North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) preference on those imports and sought a refund of duties under 19 U.S.C. 1520(d). The parties relied on a June 1997 entry as a test case. Ford was required to file certificates of origin within one year of importation, but did not file the certificate until November 1998 and was unable to secure a written waiver. Customs denied Ford’s claim, then denied Ford’s protest. The Federal Circuit rejected Ford’s argument that Customs had an affirmative obligation under its regulations to accept Ford’s untimely filing, but remanded for determination of whether traditional refund claims, not processed through the electronic “reconciliation” program, should enjoy the same waiver benefit available through that program. On remand, Customs explained that the reconciliation program (19 U.S.C. 1484(b)) is a procedural means for processing import entries, including an ability to claim the substantive duty refund benefit under section 1520(d), and has statutory safeguards that permit Customs to remedy mistakes and misconduct in awarding NAFTA duty free treatment. Many reconciliation program safeguards are not available in the traditional post-entry duty refund process. The reconciliation program provides added confidence in the legitimacy of the importer’s claims. The Federal Circuit affirmed that Customs’ interpretation of the statutory scheme was reasonable. View "Ford Motor Co. v. United States" on Justia Law

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Petitioner, owner and principal of MacBride Nigeria, seeks review of two of the Commissioner's decisions relating to the loss of concrete masonry equipment shipped from the United States to Nigeria in two separate shipping containers. BDP and Zim organized and carried out the transportation of the equipment. Petitioner alleged two identical complaints against Zim and BDP, contending that they engaged in unreasonable practices when handling the equipment, in violation of Section 10(d)(1) of the Shipping Act of 1984, 46 U.S.C. 41102(c). The court dismissed the portions of the petition relating to the first container because the petition for review of the Commission’s decision was untimely under the Hobbs Act, 28 U.S.C. 2342(3)(B), 2344. The court vacated the decision relating to the second container because the Commission improperly reduced petitioner's award for the loss of equipment. The court remanded for an award of the full amount supported by the record without mitigation and permitted under 46 C.F.R. 502.301(b). View "Adenariwo v. FMC" on Justia Law

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In 2006, the Department of Commerce announced that it was changing a method it used to calculate whether imported goods are being sold in the United States at less than fair value, i.e., being dumped. Previously, Commerce employed “zeroing” in that calculation: for goods sold above fair value, Commerce treated the sale price as being at (rather than above) fair value—it zeroed out margins above fair value and permitted no offset against below-fair-value sales in calculation of the average, resulting in larger average dumping margins than if offsetting had been allowed. The new policy generally made it more difficult to find dumping. Commerce stated that the change would apply “in all current and future antidumping investigations as of the effective date” and that it would apply the final modification to all investigations pending as of the effective date. There were seven such investigations, all initiated by petitions filed after March 6, 2006, when the new no-zeroing policy was proposed. Two companies found to have engaged in dumping argued that their cases were governed by the new policy. The Federal Circuit upheld Commerce’s determination that they were not. Commerce spoke ambiguously on timing in adopting its new policy and reasonably resolved the ambiguity to exclude the cases. View "Diamond Sawblades Mfr. Coal. v. United States" on Justia Law

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The International Trade Commission investigated DeLorme for violating the Tariff Act, 19 U.S.C. 1337, by importing, selling for importation, or selling after importation “two-way global satellite communication devices, system and components thereof” that allegedly infringed BriarTek’s patent, directed to emergency monitoring and reporting systems comprising a user unit and a monitoring system that communicate through a satellite network. The accused products included DeLorme’s InReach satellite-communication devices and software used with the devices. The Commission terminated the investigation based on entry of a consent order, in which DeLorme agreed not to import, sell for importation, or sell or offer for sale within the U.S. after importation any two-way global satellite communication devices, system, and components thereof, that infringe the Patent until the expiration, invalidation, or unenforceability of the Patent. In 2013, the Commission instituted an enforcement proceeding based on BriarTek’s allegations that DeLorme sold InReach devices containing imported components. DeLorme sought declaratory judgment of noninfringement and invalidity of the patent. While DeLorme’s action was pending, the Commission found that DeLorme violated the Order and imposed a civil penalty of $6,242,500. The Federal Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the Consent Order instead prohibited DeLorme from using imported components only if the components themselves infringed the patent. View "DeLorme Publ'g Co., Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n" on Justia Law

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The Tariff Act of 1930 gives the International Trade Commission authority to remedy only those unfair acts that involve the importation of “articles” as described in 19 U.S.C. 1337(a). The Commission instituted an investigation based on a complaint filed by Align, concerning violation of 19 U.S.C. 1337 by reason of infringement of various claims of seven different patents concerning orthodontic devices. The accused “articles” were the transmission of the “digital models, digital data and treatment plans, expressed as digital data sets, which are virtual three-dimensional models of the desired positions of the patients’ teeth at various stages of orthodontic treatment” from Pakistan to the United States. The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that the Commission lacked jurisdiction. The Commission’s decision to expand the scope of its jurisdiction to include electronic transmissions of digital data runs counter to the “unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” View "ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. Int'l Trade Comm'n" on Justia Law

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These appeals involve the Fourth and Fifth Administrative Reviews of an anti-dumping duty order covering frozen warm-water shrimp from China. Hilltop, an exporter of subject merchandise from China, was a mandatory respondent in both the Fourth and Fifth Reviews. At the beginning of the review, Hilltop filed a separate rate certification, representing that neither the company nor its affiliates were controlled by the Chinese government, and requested separate rate status, which means it would receive a company-specific anti-dumping duty rate instead of the country-wide rate calculated for the China-wide entity. After receiving information indicating Hilltop might have provided false or incomplete information regarding its affiliates and multiple remands, the Department of Commerce rejected that argument. The Court of International Trade and the Federal Circuit upheld the determination that Hilltop is ineligible for an anti-dumping duty rate separate from the country-wide entity and Commerce’s selection of the country-wide rate. View "Ad Hoc Shrimp Trade Action Comm. v. United States" on Justia Law

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Creative, an Iowa corporation, designs and sells beauty products. LF, a Hong Kong corporation, with its principal place of business in Hong Kong, provides services, including product development, shipping oversight, and production planning. LF contacted Unger, President of Creative, in Iowa, seeking to manage Creative’s operations in China and e-mailed a presentation describing proposed services. Unger traveled to Hong Kong to execute the contract. LF managed Creative’s supply chain; the companies communicated extensively electronically and by telephone for two years. As required by the contract, LF shipped pre-production and production samples (made in China by third party factories) to Iowa. LF received payments from Creative’s customers on its behalf, and sent proceeds, less deductions, to Iowa. No LF agents or employees visited Iowa and LF has no connection with Iowa outside of this business relationship. Creative filed suit in Iowa, alleging that LF breached the contract by sending samples that could not be used because they were defective. The district court dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Eighth Circuit reversed, stating that a reasonable jury could find that LF had sufficient contacts with Iowa to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction and that the exercise of jurisdiction would not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. View "Creative Calling Solutions Inc v. LF Beauty Ltd." on Justia Law

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Cross Match claimed that defendants violated 19 U.S.C. 1337(a)(1)(B)(i) by importing articles that infringe or are used to infringe its patents. The International Trade Commission entered a limited exclusion order barring importation of certain optical scanning devices. In 2013, the Federal Circuit first vacated and remanded for revision of the order to bar only a subset of the scanners, reasoning that an exclusion order may not be predicated on a theory of induced infringement under 35 U.S.C. 271(b) where direct infringement does not occur until after importation of the articles the exclusion order would bar. In doing so, the panel effectively eliminated trade relief under Section 337 for induced infringement and potentially for all types of infringement of method claims. The Federal Circuit later granted en banc rehearing and upheld the Commission’s position. Because Section 337 does not answer the question, the Commission’s interpretation of Section 337 is entitled to Chevron deference. The Commission’s interpretation is reasonable because it is consistent with Section 337 and Congress’ mandate to the Commission to safeguard United States commercial interests at the border. View "Suprema, Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n" on Justia Law

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After receiving antidumping and countervailing duty petitions from an association of U.S. manufacturers of multilayered wood flooring, the International Trade Commission initiated investigations of imports of multilayered wood flooring from China. U.S. importers of multilayered wood flooring from China, participated in the investigations under 19 U.S.C. 1671d(b) and 1673d(b). The Commission found that the domestic multilayered wood flooring industry was materially injured by reason of less-than-fair-value and subsidized subject imports from China. Following remand by the Court of International Trade, the Commission found that “the statutory ‘by reason of’ standard clearly applies to the overall causation analysis to be performed by the Commission,” reopened the record, and continued to find the domestic industry was materially injured by reason of subject imports, stating that “but for the unfairly traded subject . . . imports from China in the U.S. market during the [period of investigation], the domestic industry would have been materially better off both during the housing market collapse and during the developing recovery that followed.” The Trade Court and Federal Circuit affirmed the determination as supported by substantial evidence. View "Swiff-Train Co. v. United States" on Justia Law

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Celgard is a developer and manufacturer of battery membranes, used to separate chemical cell components in lithium-ion batteries, preventing contact between the positive and negative electrodes. The patents concerns a separator technology that uses a ceramic composite coating that helps prevent electrical shorting. This technology is used in rechargeable batteries in electronic vehicles and consumer electronic devices such as laptops and cellular phones. Celgard is headquartered in Charlotte, North Carolina. SKI is a manufacturer of separators for use in lithium-ion batteries. SKI mainly supplies the separators to third-party manufacturers, but also manufactures batteries that include the separators it produces. SKI’s principal place of business is in Seoul, Korea. All of SKI’s design, manufacturing, and sales operations are based in Korea. Celgard sued SKI for infringement. Celgard sought to establish the district court’s jurisdiction based on allegations that SKI purposefully directed activities at the forum state through sales and offers for sale of its accused separators to residents of North Carolina. The Federal Circuit affirmed dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction, under either a purposeful-direction theory or a stream-of-commerce theory, noting an absence of evidence that SKI ever sold or offered for sale the accused products in North Carolina. View "Celgard, LLC v. SK Innovation Co., Ltd." on Justia Law