Justia International Trade Opinion Summaries

In 2010, Microsoft filed a complaint in the U.S. International Trade Commission, alleging that Motorola had violated the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. 1337, by importing mobile phones and tablets that infringe several Microsoft patents. The Commission instituted an investigation and, after an evidentiary hearing, the ALJ found that the accused Motorola products did not infringe the 054, 762, 376, or 133 patents and that Microsoft had failed to prove that the mobile devices on which it relied actually implemented those patents. The Commission upheld the ALJ’s findings, finding that Microsoft failed to prove that the Microsoft-supported products on which it relied for its domestic-industry showing actually practiced the patents. The Federal Circuit reversed in part, first affirming that Motorola does not infringe the 054 patent and that Microsoft failed to prove that a domestic industry exists for products protected by the 762 and 376 patents. With respect to the 133 patent the Commission relied on incorrect claim constructions in finding no infringement, the only basis for its finding no violation, for the main group of accused products. The court affirmed the noninfringement finding for the accused alternative design. View "Microsoft Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n" on Justia Law

Del Monte imports products consisting of tuna, with sauce, in a sealed microwaveable package. The tuna accounts for 80 percent of the total product weight; the sauce accounts for 20 percent. U.S. Customs and Border Protection classified two of the three flavors under subheading 1604.14.10 of the U.S. Harmonized Tariff Schedule, which covers tuna packed “in oil,” because their sauces include some oil. Customs appraised the goods based on the price that Del Monte paid its supplier of importation, without adjusting for $1.5 million that Del Monte later received from its supplier after negotiations over the accuracy of the amount originally paid. The Court of International Trade held that Del Monte’s goods were properly classified and valued. The Federal Circuit affirmed. Fish products in which the only oil is added as part of a liquid substance introduced at the time of packing are considered “in oil” even if the liquid does not consist entirely of oil; there is no minimum threshold for the amount of oil that must be present. Imported merchandise must be appraised, when possible, based on its “transaction value,” 19 U.S.C. 1401a(a)(1), “the price actually paid or payable for the merchandise when sold for exportation,” regardless of subsequent rebates. View "Del Monte Corp. v. United States" on Justia Law

In 1996, the Department of Commerce determined that certain pasta products from Italy were being sold in the U.S. at less than fair value and published an order imposing antidumping duties. Several years later, Commerce conducted its ninth administrative review of that order, covering the period of July 1, 2004, through June 30, 2005 and arrived at an antidumping duty margin of 18.18 percent for Atar. Commerce ordinarily compares the export price of the subject merchandise with the price of like products sold in the exporter’s home market or in a representative third country, 19 U.S.C. 1677(35), 1677b(a)(1)(A)–(C). Commerce determined that it could not assess normal value by reference to Atar’s proffered home-market or third-country sales data, so it approximated the normal value of Atar’s subject goods using a constructed value approach. The Court of International Trade rejected Commerce’s calculations. After several remands, Commerce revised its profit cap determination, eventually including above- and below-cost sales made by profitable and unprofitable respondents in the prior administrative review. The trade court then sustained Commerce’s duty calculations. The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that Commerce acted reasonably in excluding below-cost sales data from the prior administrative review when calculating the constructed value profit cap applicable to Atar’s subject merchandise. View "Atar S.R.L v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2003, pursuant to a petition by U.S. furniture manufacturers and labor unions, the Department of Commerce initiated an antidumping investigation of Chinese wooden bedroom furniture manufacturers. The International Trade Commission (ITC) investigated whether the domestic industry had been materially injured and distributed questionnaires to all known domestic wooden bedroom furniture producers. Producers are required by law to respond. One question asked, “Do you support or oppose the petition?” and gave the choices: “Support,” “Oppose,” or “Take no position.” Ashley answered “Oppose;” Ethan Allen answered “Take no position.” The ITC issued an antidumping duty order. Commerce directed U.S. Customs to collect duties on entries of Chinese wooden bedroom furniture. The ITC prepared a list of Affected Domestic Producers eligible to receive a share of the duties, 19 U.S.C. 1675c(a), (d)(1) (Byrd Amendment). The ITC did not include Ashley and Ethan Allen, who sued. The Byrd Amendment has been repealed;t they sought their share from prior years. The Court of International Trade dismissed. The Federal Circuit affirmed, stating that “this framework may create incentives for domestic producers to indicate support for a petition even when they may believe that an antidumping duty order is unwarranted, it is not our task to pass on Congress’s wisdom in enacting the Byrd Amendment.” View "Ashley Furniture Indus., Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Itochu asked the U.S. Department of Commerce to act under 19 U.S.C. 1675(b) to revoke part of an antidumping-duty order applicable to imported steel nails. Before Commerce issued its preliminary determination, Itochu submitted comments and provided legal authority to urge that the requested partial revocation take effect at an early specified date. Commerce rejected that position in its preliminary ruling and generally invited interested parties to comment. Itochu did not avail itself of that opportunity. In its final ruling, Commerce adopted the partial revocation, which the domestic industry did not oppose, but with the later effective date. When Itochu challenged the effective-date determination, the U.S.s Court of International Trade declined to address the merits, citing failure to exhaust administrative remedies, 28 U.S.C. 2637(d), because Itochu had failed to resubmit, after the preliminary ruling, the comments it had submitted earlier. The Federal Circuit reversed, stating that in these circumstances, requiring exhaustion served no discernible practical purpose and resulting delay would have risked harm to Itochu. View "Itochu Bldg. Prods. v. United States" on Justia Law

MPS and O2 Micro compete in the market for integrated circuit products that control LCD and LED lighting. O2 had filed several prior patent infringement claims against MPS and its customers. MPS sought a declaratory judgment of noninfringement and invalidity with respect to four related O2 patents (the 519 family). After O2 learned of the suit, O2 filed a complaint with the International Trade Commission (ITC), under section 337 of the Tariff Act, against MPS and its customers, claiming that their imports infringed the 519 patents and the 382 patent. In the court action, O2 counterclaimed for infringement, added MPS customers, as counter-defendants, and moved to stay proceedings. The court denied the motion. O2 later withdrew assertions concerning the 519 family from both proceedings and covenanted not to sue MPS or its customers for infringement of those patents. O2 insisted that the 382 patent was entitled to a 1998 conception date and filed verified interrogatories attesting to that. O2’s story ultimately unraveled and it “sought to mask its proffer of false testimony.” Ultimately, the court ruled that the earliest invention date was 1999: O2 signed a covenant not to sue with respect to the patent. The district court later dismissed all claims with prejudice and granted fees and costs, based on an exceptional case finding on O2’s “vexatious litigation strategy, litigation misconduct and unprofessional behavior.” The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Monolithic Power Sys., Inc. v. O2 Micro Int'l, Ltd." on Justia Law

Trek was the importer of record for 72 entries of men’s suits in 2004. Mercantile was the consignee. Shadadpuri is president and sole shareholder of Trek, and a 40% shareholder of Mercantile. Trek and Mercantile provided a number of fabric “assists” to manufacturers outside the U. S. An assist refers to “materials, components, parts, and similar items incorporated in the imported merchandise,” 19 U.S.C. 1401a(h)(1)(A)(i). Customs determined that the entry documentation failed to include the cost of the fabric assists in the price paid for the suits which lowered the amount of duty payable by Trek. Shadadpuri had previously failed to include assists in entry declarations when acting on behalf of a corporate importer. The Court of International Trade found Shadadpuri liable for gross negligence in connection with the entry of imported merchandise and imposed penalties under 19 U.S.C. 1592(c)(2). The Federal Circuit reversed the penalty assessment, holding that corporate officers of an “importer of record” are not directly liable for penalties. Shadadpuri is not liable, absent piercing Trek’s corporate veil to establish that Shadadpuri was the actual importer of record, as defined by statute, or establishing that Shadadpuri is liable for fraud or as an aider and abettor. View "United States v. Trek Leather, Inc." on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a dispute between the parties over license agreements which allowed Myriad access to Oracle's Java programming language. On appeal, Myriad challenged the district court's partial denial of its motion to compel arbitration. The court concluded that the incorporation of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) arbitration rules into the parties' commercial contract constituted clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Oracle America, Inc. v. Myriad Group A.G." on Justia Law

La Crosse imports electronic devices that measure atmospheric conditions and display the information alongside time and date. The devices use wireless instruments that measure outdoor conditions and a base unit that measure indoor conditions and have an LCD display, a barometer, and a microprocessor. The microprocessor uses an algorithm to analyze historical barometric measurements to provide a forecast of whether the weather will improve or deteriorate, is displayed as an arrow, a series of icons, or an image of a boy whose clothes indicate the type of weather predicted. U.S. Customs initially classified all the devices as “other clocks” under Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTSUS) c9105.91.40. The U.S. Court of International Trade reclassified many of the devices according to three general categories. The court classified Weather Station models under HTSUS subheading 9025.80.10 (including thermometers, barometers, hygrometers, and combinations of these instruments); Professional models under subheading 9015.80.80 (including certain “meteorological ... instruments and appliances”); and Clock models under subheading 9105.91.40 (certain clocks). The Federal Circuit reversed as to the Weather Station and Clock models and ordered classification under HTSUS subheading 9015.80.80. View "La Crosse Tech., Ltd. v. United States" on Justia Law

The government appealed the district court's order which altered the terms of a bond the Coast Guard had fixed for the release of a detained ship that was under investigation and restricted the types of penalties the government could seek for the ship's potential violations of certain ocean pollution prevention statutes. The ship at issue, the Pappadakis, an ocean-going bulk cargo carrier carrying a shipment of coal to Brazil, was detained by the Coast Guard because the vessel had likely been discharging bilge water overboard. The court reversed and remanded for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) where the matter was not subject to review in the district court because the Coast Guard's actions were committed to agency discretion by law. Consequently, the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider the petition. View "Angelex Ltd. v. United States" on Justia Law