Justia International Trade Opinion Summaries

Johnson Controls, a Wisconsin manufacturer of building management systems and HVAC equipment, and Edman Controls entered into an agreement giving Edman exclusive rights to distribute Johnson’s products in Panama. In 2009, Johnson breached the agreement by attempting to sell its products directly to Panamanian developers, circumventing Edman. Edman invoked the agreement’s arbitration clause. The arbitrator concluded that Johnson had breached the agreement and that Edman was entitled to damages. Johnson sought to vacate or modify the arbitral award, challenging the way in which the award took account of injuries to Edman’s subsidiaries and the arbitrator’s alleged refusal to follow Wisconsin law. The district court ruled in Edman’s favor. The Seventh Circuit affirmed and upheld the district court’s award of attorney fees. View "Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Edman Controls, Inc." on Justia Law

Shell imported petroleum products, 1993-1994, upon which custom duties, taxes, and other fees were paid. During the same period, Shell exported drawback-eligible substitute finished petroleum derivatives. In 1995-1996, substitution drawback claims were filed with the U.S. Customs and Border Protection on Shell’s behalf. Generally, Customs provides a drawback of 99% of any duty, tax, or fee imposed under federal law upon entry or importation if the merchandise (or a commercially interchangeable substitute) is subsequently exported or destroyed under Customs supervision and not used within the U.S. before exportation or destruction, 19 U.S.C. 1313(j),(p). Drawback claims must be filed within three years of exportation. During the time of Shell’s imports, drawback eligibility of Harbor Maintenance Tax and Environmental Tax payments, which Shell now seeks, were heavily disputed. Shell was found not to have included an express request for HMT and ET in the “net claim” figure. In 1997, after the three-year period for the filing of drawback claims had expired Shell filed protests with Customs, seeking drawback as to HMT and ET payments. Customs denied Shell’s protests. The Court of International Trade found the claims time-barred. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that 1999 and 2004 statutory amendments did not change Shell’s position.View "Shell Oil Co. v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2004 Ford owned the British car maker Jaguar. In 2004 and 2005, Ford imported Jaguar-brand cars. On the cars’ entry into the U. S., Ford deposited estimated duty payments with Customs. Ford subsequently concluded that its estimates were too high and filed reconciliation entries seeking a refund. The total refund claimed, across nine disputed entries at issue, was about $6.2 million. The general one-year time period imposed for liquidating such entries had long expired when Ford filed suit, 19 U.S.C. 1504(a). The Court of International Trade rejected the complaint’s assertion of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1581(i), the Tariff Act’s grant of residual jurisdiction over matters concerning enforcement and administration of duty assessment. The Federal Circuit reversed, finding valid invocation of the court’s residual jurisdiction, as the importer could not have asserted jurisdiction under any of the other enumerated provisions of section 1581. Post-complaint efforts by Customs to clear the importer’s accounts did not undo such jurisdiction.View "Ford Motor Co. v. United States" on Justia Law

Jensen, a licensed customs broker, filed with Customs 308 protests on behalf of importers, seeking reliquidation of 1,529 entries of softwood lumber from Canada. More than two years later, Jensen inquired about the status of the protests. After nearly two months, Customs replied that the protests had been consolidated under a “lead protest” and that a draft decision letter had been prepared, but not finalized, and suggested that Jensen contact the Port of Detroit for a list of consolidated protests. Jensen expressed concern that Port of Detroit might not possess a complete list, as some protests had been filed in other ports. Receiving no response, Jensen filed suit in the Court of International Trade to preserve appeal rights. Customs subsequently stated, via email, that pursuant to 19 C.F.R. 177.7(b), it would not issue a ruling with respect to any issue pending before the Court of International Trade. Jensen then sought a writ of mandamus to compel Customs to rule on its protests. The Court of International Trade held that it lacked jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1581(i), reasoning that Jensen could seek accelerated disposition of its protests by Customs under 19 U.S.C. 1515(b) and contest any subsequent denial. The Federal Circuit affirmed.View "Norman G. Jensen, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2009, following a petition and a related investigation, the Department of Commerce issued anti-dumping orders concerning citric acid and certain citrate salts from Canada and the People's Republic of China: In the Final Scope Determination, Commerce found the portion of GCG’s merchandise consisting of citric acid from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), approximately 35 percent, within the scope of the anti-dumping duty and countervailing duty orders. The Court of International Trade sustained the determination. The Federal Circuit affirmed. Commerce’s application of the Order, assessing a duty on GCG’s product “according to the rates applicable to citric acid from both the PRC and any other country represented in the blend, based upon the quantity and value of citric acid from each country included in the blend,” evidences that Commerce’s interpretation appropriately accounts for both the physical scope of the product as well as the country of origin.View "Global Commodity Grp., LLC v. United States" on Justia Law

Germany and Thailand signed a treaty, providing that disputes concerning investments between Germany or Thailand and an investor of the other party may be resolved by arbitration at the request of either party. The treaty applies to “approved investments” made before the treaty by investors of either country in the territory of the other. Bau initiated arbitration, claiming that Thailand had interfered with investments made, 1989-1997, in a Thai tollway project. An arbitration tribunal convened under agreed terms, which empowered the tribunal to consider objections to jurisdiction and provided that U.N. Commission on International Trade Law Arbitration Rules would apply. Thailand objected to jurisdiction on the ground that Bau’s were not “approved investments” because Bau never obtained a “Certificate of Admission” from Thailand’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Bau responded that the project was comprised of “approved investments” because Bau was invited to make the investments by the Thai Council of Ministers, which approved the project at various stages, and because the Thai Board of Investment issued certificates of investment for the project. The tribunal held that it had jurisdiction and made an award in favor of Bau. The district court confirmed. The Second Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the court should have independently adjudicated jurisdiction instead of performing deferential review.View "Schneider v. Kingdom of Thailand" on Justia Law

In 1996 Beloit agreed to build high-speed paper-making machines for Indonesian paper companies. Two of the companies executed promissory notes in favor of Beloit reflecting a principal indebtedness of $43.8 million. The paper companies guaranteed the notes; Beloit assigned them to JPMorgan in exchange for construction financing. The machines were delivered in 1998 but did not run as specified. In 2000 the parties settled claims pertaining to the machines but preserved obligations under the notes. JPMorgan sued for nonpayment. The district court held that warranty-based claims were foreclosed by the settlement and that other defenses lacked merit; it awarded JPMorgan $53 million. After the appeal was filed, JPMorgan issued citations to discover assets. Although the companies raised an international conflict-of-law question, the district court ordered compliance with the citations. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The settlement waived implied warranty defenses and counterclaims. The fraud defense is also mostly barred; to the extent it is not, the evidence was insufficient to survive summary judgment. The court also rejected defenses that the notes lacked consideration; that the notes were issued for a “special purpose” and were not intended to be repaid; and that JPMorgan is not a holder in due course. The discovery order was not appealable. View "JPMorgan Chase & Co., N.A. v. Asia Pulp & Paper Co., Ltd." on Justia Law

Avisma produces magnesium and titanium sponge in Russia. The process starts with a dehydration step. Most of the resultant raw magnesium is then processed into pure and alloyed magnesium, the subject of an antidumping order issued by Commerce in response to a petition by domestic producers. A portion of the raw magnesium is used to produce titanium sponge. After Commerce imposed a 15.77 percent duty, the Trade Court remanded the case. On remand, Commerce declined to alter the determination. The Trade Court then held that, when determining Avisma’s magnesium production costs for purposes of calculating the constructed value of Avisma’s magnesium, Commerce was required to take into account Avisma’s entire production process, which includes titanium, as well as magnesium. In its second remand determination, Commerce determined the constructed value of Avisma’s magnesium by taking into account Avisma’s entire production process, resulting in an antidumping duty of 8.51 percent. The Trade Court issued final judgment accordingly. The Federal Circuit reversed and reinstated Commerce’s earlier decision. The Trade Court erred in requiring Commerce to consider an affidavit by Avisma’s accountant that Commerce had determined was untimely. View "PSC VSMPO-Avisma Corp. v. United States" on Justia Law

CS manufactures and sells X-ray and metal detection devices for use in public facilities around the world. Tecapro is a private, state-owned company that was formed by the Vietnamese government to advanced technologies into the Vietnamese market. In 2010, Tecapro purchased 28 customized AutoClear X-ray machines from CS for $1,021,156. The contract provides that disputes shall be settled at International Arbitration Center of European countries for claim in the suing party’s country under the rule of the Center. Tecapro initiated arbitration proceedings in Belgium in November 2010. In December 2010, CS notified Tecapro of its intention to commence arbitration proceedings in New Jersey. In January 2011, CS filed its petition to compel arbitration in New Jersey and enjoin Tecapro from proceeding with arbitration in Belgium. The district court concluded that it had subject matter jurisdiction under the U.N.Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, that it had personal jurisdiction over Tecapro, and that Tecapro could have sought to arbitrate in Vietnam and CS in New Jersey. The latter is what happened, so “the arbitration shall proceed in New Jersey.” After determining that it had jurisdiction under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 1, the Third Circuit affirmed.View "Control Screening LLC v. Technological Application & Prod. Co." on Justia Law

The now-repealed Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (Byrd Amendment) allowed affected domestic producers (ADPs) to receive distributions of antidumping duties collected by the U.S., 19 U.S.C. 1675c. In order to be included on the list of ADPS, a domestic producer must have been either a petitioner or an “interested party in support of the petition” for an antidumping order. Domestic producers could show support either “by letter or through questionnaire response.” The U.S. International Trade Commission found that plaintiff did not qualify as an ADP because its final questionnaire response indicated that it took no position regarding the underlying petition, concerning dumping of crawfish tail meat from China. On remand, the ITC determined that plaintiff qualified, but U.S. Customs found that plaintiff was eligible for distributions for fiscal years 2002 and 2003, but that eligibility applied only to the extent that funds are either recoverable from the affected domestic producers who initially received them or are available in the Special Account. The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that plaintiff is an ADP under the Byrd Amendment and should not be treated as a “second class” ADP.View "PS Chez Sidney,L.L.P. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n" on Justia Law