Justia International Trade Opinion Summaries

In 2001, U.S. Customs classified Aromont's imported flavorings, derived from veal, chicken, duck, lamb, beef, fish, lobster, mushroom, or vegetable stock, under Harmonized Tariff Schedule subheading 2104.10.00 covering "[s]oups and broths and preparations therefor ... Other." Aromont argued that the flavorings should have been classified under subheading 2106.90.99 covering "[f]ood preparations not elsewhere specified or included," which carries a lower ad valorem tax. Customs denied the protest and liquidated the merchandise. The Trade Court found that the products are not covered by 2104 because they are not principally used as soups or broths, but in a variety of end uses. The Federal Circuit affirmed. Aromont made a strong showing with respect to actual use, physical characteristics, and cost. The government did not show that any other factors required a contrary result, or that there is an issue of material fact on any of the relevant factors.View "Aromont USA, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

TIRN appealed from the district court's dismissal of its claim on res judicata grounds. TIRN alleged that the State Department failed to satisfy its consultation and environmental assessment obligations under the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., and the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq., in conducting annual certifications of countries exempted from the general ban on shrimp imports. At issue was whether TIRN's current lawsuit for NEPA and ESA violations was precluded by its earlier lawsuits challenging the State Department's regulations implementing the Section 609(b)(2) of Public Law 101-162 certification process. The court held that because TIRN's current challenge arose from the same transactional nucleus of facts as earlier litigation, res judicata barred its claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court. View "Turtle Island Restoration Network, et al. v. U.S. Dept. of State" on Justia Law

In an action under the Tariff Act, 19 U.S.C. 1337, the International Trade Commission found unfair trade practices based on infringement of Epson's U.S. patents by importation and sale of ink printer cartridges produced in China by Ninestar and imported into and sold in the U.S. by entities including Ninestar's subsidiaries, The Commission issued a general exclusion order, limited exclusion orders, and cease and desist orders. The Federal Circuit affirmed. Final Orders prohibited importation and sale of infringing cartridges, including cartridges in the inventory of U.S. subsidiaries. Subsidiaries continued to import and sell cartridges that were subject to the orders. An Administrative Law Judge determined that Ninestar was in violation and levied a penalty under 19 U.S.C. 1337(f)(2). The Commission reduced the penalty. The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding Ninestar China jointly and severally liable for the penalty ($55,000 per day, a total of $11,110,000) along with the U.S. subsidiaries. Ninestar was aware that refurbishing and reselling spent cartridges, not first sold in the U.S., would be patent infringement View "Ninestar Tech. Co., Ltd. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, domestic producers, sought distributions under the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, since repealed, which directed the government to distribute collected duties to domestic producers harmed by dumping, 19 U.S.C. 1675c(a). Plaintiffs also sought to compel assessment and collection of additional anti-dumping duties, claiming that U.S. Customs has failed to collect $723 million $771 million in assessed anti-dumping duties. The U.S. Court of International Trade dismissed. Certain counts were dismissed for lack of standing on the ground that plaintiffs were not intended third-party beneficiaries of bond contracts intended to cover anti-dumping penalties. Other counts were dismissed for for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or failure to state a claim. The Federal Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part, finding alternate grounds for dismissal. The court lacked jurisdiction over claims against the sureties. Plaintiffs do not qualify as intended third-party beneficiaries. View "Sioux Honey Ass'n v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed this declaratory judgment action in federal district court in Mississippi, seeking relief against their longtime Costa Rican distributor. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction over defendants. The court held that, even if defendants could reasonably anticipate being haled into Mississippi federal court, they could not reasonably anticipate being so haled to answer claims such as these. Seeing no constitutionally adequate nexus between plaintiffs' claims and defendants' Mississippi contacts, the court concluded that plaintiffs have failed to present a prima facie case that a Mississippi district court could exercise specific jurisdiction over defendants. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "ITL Int'l, Inc., et al. v. Constenla, S.A., et al." on Justia Law

Following about 30 years of oil extraction in the Ecuadorian Amazon, Ecuadorians brought a variety of claims against the company and obtained judgment in Ecuador. Chevron, a potential judgment-debtor, brought action under New York’s Uniform Foreign Country Money-Judgments Recognition Act, N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5301-5309, which allows judgment-creditors to enforce foreign judgments in New York courts, seeking a global anti-enforcement injunction against the Ecuadorians and their attorney to prohibit attempts to enforce the allegedly-fraudulent judgment entered by the Ecuadorian court. The district court granted the injunction. The Second Circuit reversed, vacating the injunction. The Recognition Act does not grant putative judgment-debtors a cause of action to challenge foreign judgments before enforcement of those judgments is sought. Judgment-debtors can challenge a foreign judgment’s validity under the Act only defensively, in response to an attempted enforcement.View "Chevron Corp. v. Donziger" on Justia Law

The Pennsylvania Steel Products Procurement Act,73 Pa. Cons. Stat. 1881-1887, prohibits the use of temporary bridges made out of foreignsteel on public works projects. The district court rejected a claim that the law was preempted by the Buy America Act, 23 U.S.C. 313, and that it violated the Commerce Clause, Contract Clause, and Equal Protection Clause. The Third Circuit affirmed. The federal Act contemplates more restrictive state laws. The state law was authorized by Congress, is rational, and did not, at its enactment, impair plaintiff's existing contracts. View "Mabey Bridge & Shore, Inc. v. Schoch" on Justia Law

Defendant, a citizen of Macau, engaged in efforts to import protected defense articles from the United States into China, without the licenses required by law. Defendant was convicted after a jury trial on four counts of conspiracy and attempt to export defense articles without a license, money laundering, and conspiracy and attempt to smuggle goods from the United States. Defendant challenged his conviction and sentence. The court concluded that venue was proper in the Southern District of California; disagreed with defendant that the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. 2778, violated the nondelegation principle; concluded that defendant's conviction on count three must be vacated as a matter of law because attempting to cause an export of a defense article was not a federal crime; defendant's conviction on count four must also be vacated for lack of jurisdiction; and because the district court should have allowed defendant to present evidence of duress to the jury, the court reversed and remanded for a new trial on counts one and two. The court did not reach defendant's arguments regarding his sentence. View "United States v. Kuok" on Justia Law

Defendant, a Russian citizen, attended graduate school and owns real property, vehicles, and bank accounts in Ohio. He spends some time in Ohio each year, ranging from 40 days in 2007 to a total of 17 days in 2008–2009. He visits under a tourist visa and does not have an Ohio driver's license. After going to Russia to take part in a business venture with defendant, plaintiff filed suit in Ohio. The contract had no connection to the state. The trial court dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction, noting that defendant was not served with process in a manner that automatically confers personal jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that notions of fair play and substantial justice weigh against jurisdiction in Ohio. The court quoted a Russian proverb, “If you’re afraid of wolves, don’t go into the forest” that could be read, “If you’re afraid of the Russian legal system, don't do business in Russia.” View "Conn v. Zakharov" on Justia Law

SLM appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of IFIC, a surety, against SLM, the principal on a bond pursuant to which IFIC paid Customs import duties assessed against SLM. The court held that the district court had jurisdiction to adjudicate IFIC's claims against SLM; exclusive jurisdiction over these claims did not lie in the Court of International Trade (CIT). The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to dismiss or abate IFIC's action until the proceedings in the CIT have concluded. With regard to the merits of IFIC's claims against SLM, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of IFIC, concluding that SLM was required to pay IFIC the amounts that IFIC had paid to Customs pursuant to its bond obligations. View "Int'l Fidelity Ins. v. Sweet Little Mexico Corp." on Justia Law