Justia International Trade Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Tax Law
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A Controlled Foreign Corporation’s income is not taxable to its domestic shareholders unless the income is distributed to them. CFC shareholders began taking loans either from the CFC or from third-party financial institutions using the CFC’s assets as collateral or having the CFC guarantee the loans to obtain a monetary return on their foreign investment. The Revenue Act of 1962 requires the inclusion in the domestic shareholder’s annual income of any increase in investment in U.S. properties made by a CFC it controls, 26 U.S.C. 956(c)(1)(C), and provides that a CFC shall be considered as holding an obligation of a U.S. person if such CFC is a pledgor or guarantor of such obligations. IRS regulations determine when a CFC’s pledge or guarantee results in the CFC being deemed the holder of the loan, and how much of the “obligation” a CFC pledgor or guarantor is deemed to hold, 26 C.F.R. 1.956-2(c)(1) and 1.956-1(e)(2). Through the SIH family, Appellant owns two CFCs. Another SIH affiliate, SIG, borrowed $1.5 billion from Merrill Lynch in 2007 in a loan guaranteed by over 30 SIH affiliates, including the CFCs that Appellant owns. Although the loan dwarfed the CFCs’ assets (roughly $240 million), Merrill Lynch insisted on having the CFCs guarantee. In 2011, when the CFCs distributed earnings to Appellant, their domestic shareholder, the IRS determined that Appellant should have reported the income at the time the CFCs guaranteed the SIG loan, treating each CFC as if it had made the entire loan directly, though the amount included in Appellant’s income was reduced from the $1.5 billion principal of the loan to the CFCs’ combined “applicable earnings.” This resulted in an additional tax of $378,312,576 to Appellant. The IRS applied the then-applicable 35% rate for ordinary income. The Tax Court and Third Circuit ruled in favor of the IRS, rejecting Appellant’s challenges to the validity of the regulations and the use of the ordinary income tax rate. View "SIH Partners LLLP v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

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Income earned by Americans typically is taxed in the U.S., regardless of where it is earned. European countries only tax income earned within their borders. To address possible “double taxation” the U.S. generally provides credits for taxes paid to foreign governments; European systems typically exempt from taxation income earned abroad. Congress, believing that the exemption method puts American companies at a trade disadvantage, has enacted various tax regimes, then received push-back from its European trading partners, who claimed each was an effective export subsidy.The 2000 ETI Act, intended to ease the burden of the tax revisions on domestic producers, was rejected in the World Trade Organization (WTO). Congress responded with the 2004 American Jobs Creation Act (AJCA), 118 Stat. 1418. Section 101 repeals the ETI provision that excluded extraterritorial income from taxation, effective for “transactions after December 31, 2004.” Section 101(d), provides: In the case of transactions during 2005 or 2006, the amount includible in gross income by reason of the amendments made by this section shall not exceed the applicable percentage of the amount which would have been so included but for this subsection. In 2005, WTO found that the ACJA improperly maintained prohibited ETI subsidies through transitional and grandfathering measures. Congress repealed section 101(f), effective for “taxable years beginning after” May 17, 2006. It did not repeal or revise section 101(d).Pursuant to a 2006 Agreement, DWA recognized qualifying extraterritorial income for 2006, invoked section 101(d), and excluded 60% from gross income. The IRS allowed the exclusion. DWA subsequently sought refunds for 2007-2009, claiming the section 101(d) exclusion. The Federal Circuit, disagreeing with the IRS and the Claims Court, held that section 101(d) unambiguously provides transitional relief for all extraterritorial income received from transactions entered into in 2005 and 2006, even income received in later years. View "DWA Holdings LLC v. United States" on Justia Law

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The Tariff Act of 1930 permits the Department of Commerce to impose two types of duties on imports that injure domestic industries: antidumping duties on goods sold in the U.S. "at less than ... fair value,” 19 U.S.C. 1673 and countervailing duties on goods that receive “a countervailable subsidy” from a foreign government, 1671(a). Commerce has long collected both types of duties from market economy importers. In 2012, Congress enacted legislation that overruled the Federal Circuit’s 2011 decision, GPXI, and permitted imposition of both antidumping and countervailing duties with respect to importers from non-market economy (NME) countries. Because this law is retroactive and does not require Commerce to adjust for any double counting that may result from the retroactive imposition of both countervailing and antidumping duties, Wireking, an importer affected by the change, claimed that it violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of Article I, Section 9 of the U.S. Constitution. The Court of International Trade upheld the new law. The Federal Circuit affirmed. Wireking did not show that the absence of a retrospective double-counting provision negates the law’s predominantly remedial impact. The 2012 law is not punitive and does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. View "Guangdong Wireking Housewares v. United States" on Justia Law

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Deckers imported UGG® Classic Crochet boots having a knit upper portion and a rubber sole. They do not have laces, buckles, or fasteners, can be pulled on by hand, and extend above the ankle. At liquidation, Customs classified the boots under Subheading 19.35, covering: “Footwear with outer soles of rubber, plastics, leather or composition leather and uppers of textile materials: Footwear with outer soles of rubber or plastics: Other: Footwear with open toes or open heels; footwear of the slip-on type, that is held to the foot without the use of laces or buckles or other fasteners, the foregoing except footwear of subheading 6404.19.20 and except footwear having a foxing or foxing-like band wholly or almost wholly of rubber or plastics applied or molded at the sole and overlapping the upper” and subject to a duty rate of 37.5 percent. Deckers sought reclassification under subheading 6404.19.90, covering“[f]ootwear with outer soles of rubber . . . uppers of textile materials” that is “[v]alued [at] over $12/pair,” subject to a duty rate of nine percent. Customs rejected an argument that the term “footwear of the slip-on type” only encompasses footwear that does not extend above the ankle. The Trade Court granted the government summary judgment. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Deckers Outdoor Corp. v. United States" on Justia Law

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In its tax return for the year 1997, ConEd claimed multiple deductions pertaining to a lease-in/lease-out (LILO) tax shelter transaction under which a Dutch utility, EZH, a tax-indifferent entity because it is not subject to U.S. taxation, conveyed to ConEd a gas-fired cogeneration plant that delivers power to customers in the Netherlands, then leased it back, followed by a reconveyance to EZH and a sublease. The stated purpose of the arrangement was tax avoidance. LILO transactions accelerate losses to the taxpayer and defer gains. The transaction provided several upfront deductions that allowed ConEd to pay lower taxes in 1997 (and in later years) than it otherwise would have. The IRS disallowed these claimed deductions and assessed a deficiency of $328,066. ConEd paid the deficiency and filed a refund claim; when this claim was denied, ConEd filed suit. The Claims Court awarded ConEd a full refund. The Federal Circuit reversed, applying the substance-over-form doctrine to conclude that ConEd’s claimed deductions must be disallowed. There was a reasonable likelihood that EZH would exercise its purchase option at the conclusion of the ConEd sublease, thus rendering the master lease illusory. View "Consol. Edison Co. of NY v. United States" on Justia Law

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In 1998, the Supreme Court held that the Harbor Maintenance Tax, 26 U.S.C. 4461-4462, was unconstitutional as applied to exports. U.S. Customs enacted procedures for refunds and established a separate HMT database with data from its ACS database, through which HMT payments had been processed. Customs discovered wide-spread inaccuracies in its HMT database, but was unable to make corrections related to payments made before July 1, 1990, because it no longer had original documents. Customs established different requirements for supporting documentation, depending on whether an exporter was seeking a refund of pre- or post-July 1, 1990 payments. Ford sought HMT refunds for both pre- and post-July 1, 1990, payments and has received more than $17 million, but claims that Customs still owes about $2.5 million. In addition to a FOIA Report of Ford’s pre-July 1, 1990 payments was drawn from information in the ACS database, Ford submitted an affidavit attesting that it was only claiming refunds of HMT paid on exports and declarations about the consistency and quality of its quarterly HMT payment records. Customs denied the claims. The Trade Court entered judgment in favor of the government. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The claims were insufficient because there still was high potential for error. View "Ford Motor Co. v. United States" on Justia Law

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The company wished to use cash reserves from subsidiaries in Ireland for activities such as stock repurchase. Foreign income is not taxable in the U.S. when earned, but is taxed if invested in U.S. property, 26 U.S.C. 951-965, including debt obligations of U.S. companies. To obtain use of the funds, the company entered into a 20-year interest rate swap. The IRS notice then in effect provided that, upon sale of one "leg" of a swap, the lump sum exchanged for the right to receive revenues over the remaining life of the swap, should not be recognized as income all at once, but should be accounted for over the life of the swap. Parties are now required to treat all such payments as loans. In 2004, the IRS assessed deficiencies of $472,870,042, characterizing the transactions as immediately-taxable loans, not sales. The district court agreed. The Third Circuit affirmed. The former notice did not apply because the transactions were loans. The parties structured the transactions expecting to recover principal; involvement of a third-party bank did not preclude characterization as a loan. Disparate treatment is not ordinarily considered a defense to tax liability. View "Merck & Co, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff imported the LCD monitors and entered them under a subheading of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States for "Automatic data processing machines and units thereof; magnetic or optical readers, machines for transcribing data onto data media in coded form and machines for processing such data, not elsewhere specified or included: Input or output units, whether or not containing storage units in the same housing: Other: Display units: Other: Other." The Bureau of Customs and Border Protection classified and reliquidated the monitors under a subheading, dutiable at 5% ad valorem, for: "Reception apparatus for television, whether or not incorporating radiobroadcast receivers or sound or video recording or reproducing apparatus; video monitors and video projectors: video monitors: Color: With a flat panel screen: Other: Other. " The Court of International Trade upheld the designation. The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded because the Court of International Trade expressly did not reach the issue of the adequacy of the evidence for either a principal use or principal function.