Justia International Trade Opinion Summaries

Following a 1996 investigation, the Department of Commerce declared that freshwater crawfish tail meat imported from China was subject to antidumping duties. In 2001, JCOF imported that product from Yangzhou, which qualified as a “new exporter” under 19 U.S.C. 1675(a)(2)(B). JCOF obtained, from AHAC , a one-year, continuous $600,000 bond, 19 U.S.C. 1675(a)(2)(B)(iii), made two entries from Yangzhou, and declared a 0% duty rate, the deposit rate then in effect for shipments by Yangzhou. Commerce conducted administrative review of 2001-2002 entries; the final results assigned Yangzhou a 223.01% rate. Customs liquidated the entries and billed JCOF, which failed to pay. Customs sought payment from AHAC, which filed protest. Another exporter challenged Commerce’s 2004 administrative review. Following dissolution of a resultant injunction, which had not applied to Yangzhou, Customs nonetheless reliquidated JCOF’s entries, issued new bills, and denied AHAC’s protest. AHAC did not appeal, but filed another protest, which was denied. Customs demanded $1,157,898.22. AHAC asserted that the collection action was moot because the erroneous reliquidations voided the previous liquidations, so that no valid liquidation occurred and the entries should be deemed liquidated under 19 U.S.C. 1504(d) at the initially-declared 0% rate. The Court of International Trade and Federal Circuit held that AHAC was obligated to pay. The reliquidations voided the original liquidations, but AHAC failed to preserve its rights by timely litigation; the reliquidations became final, “whether legal or not.” The court remanded the issues of equitable and statutory prejudgment interest. View "United States v. Am. Home Assurance Co." on Justia Law

Dobek was an engineer in charge of providing parts for F-16 fighter planes owned by the Venezuelan Air Force. The U.S. State Department announced that munitions, including parts for military aircraft, could no longer be exported to Venezuela without an export license, and revoked existing licenses. Dobek created firms to carry on business with Venezuela. The Venezuelan Air Force told Dobek that it needed canopy seals for its F-16s. Suspecting that Dobek was selling canopy seals to Venezuela, FBI agents executed a warrant at Dobek’s home, where they found a purchase order for the seals, with no purchaser named. Dobek had certified that he understood that the “products … to be provided are controlled by the … International Traffic in Arms Regulations.” He told a friend that he was looking for a box to ship “cockpit seals.” FedEx shipping records revealed that Dobek had shipped a box, labeled as “base molding,” to Venezuela after that discussion. This pattern of purchase and shipment was repeated a year later. Dobek was convicted of exporting munitions illegally, 22 U.S.C. 2778(b)(2), and conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 371. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the admissibility of an alleged co-conspirator’s emails, the sufficiency of the evidence, and the validity of the jury instruction on willfulness, stating that evidence of willfulness was overwhelming. View "United States v. Dobek" on Justia Law

The International Trade Commission determines whether the dumping of certain imports has materially injured or threatened material injury to the domestic industry by sending questionnaires to foreign producers and exporters, and to members of the domestic industry, seeking production and financial data. The questionnaires specifically ask the respondents whether they support, oppose, or take no position on the anti-dumping petition. The 2000 Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act (CDSOA), provided for the distribution of recovered anti-dumping duties to “affected domestic producers”of the dumped goods, 19 U.S.C. 1675c. CDSOA, which defined “affected domestic producer” as a petitioner or interested party in support of the petition with respect to which an antidumping duty order entered, was repealed in 2006. The repeal was not retroactive. Schaeffler‘s challenge to CDSOA’s constitutionality under the Due Process Clause was dismissed by the Court of International Trade. The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding that the petition support requirement of CDSOA rationally related to the government’s interest in rewarding members of the domestic industry that supported anti-dumping petitions. View "Schaeffler Group USA, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Standard markets kinesiotherapy devices, including models that practice claims of its 605 Patent. In 2009, Standard formed a subsidiary to distribute products in the U.S. Neither Standard nor Standard U.S. manufactures in the U.S.; Standard sources components from suppliers in the U.S. and other countries. It contracts Chinese manufacturers to assemble devices from those components for export to more than 50 countries, including the U.S. The U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) addressed four components in its domestic industry analysis: a backbone material, a rubber, microcontrollers, and a pigment. The backbone material, rubber, pigment, and wafers used in the microcontrollers are manufactured in the U.S. Lelo, a California corporation with a Swedish majority shareholder, imports kinesiotherapy devices. Standard filed a 19 U.S.C. 1337 complaint alleging that Lelo imported kinesiotherapy devices and components that infringed its 605 Patent. The ITC concluded that statutory domestic industry requirements were satisfied upon a showing of a “significant investment in plant or equipment” and a “significant employment of labor or capital.” The Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that qualitative factors alone are insufficient. The purchase of so-called “crucial” components from third-party U.S. suppliers was insufficient to satisfy the “significant investment” or “significant employment of labor or capital” criteria absent evidence that connects the cost of the components to an increase of U.S. investment or employment. View "LELO Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n" on Justia Law

The Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, 19 U.S.C. 1675c(a) (2000), (Byrd Amendment) provided for the distribution of antidumping duties collected by the United States to “affected domestic producers” of goods that are subject to an antidumping duty order and defined an “affected domestic producer” as a party that either petitioned for an antidumping duty order or was an “interested party in support of the petition.. The Byrd Amendment was repealed in 2006, but the repealing statute provided that any duties paid on goods that entered the United States before the date of repeal would continue to be distributed in accordance with the pre-repeal statutory scheme. Several ineligible domestic producers challenged the constitutionality of the Byrd Amendment, which was upheld against challenges based on the First Amendment and the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment. The Court of International Trade rejected a challenge asserting that the retroactive application of the Byrd Amendment violates due process. The Federal Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the prior holding that the statute promoted a substantial governmental interest in a rational manner, in the context of First Amendment and equal protection analysis, applied. The constitutionality of the statute turns on the same standard. View "Pat Huval Rest. & Oyster Bar, Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n" on Justia Law

In 1998, the Coalition filed a petition alleging that domestic producers of preserved mushrooms were injured by imports of preserved mushrooms from Chile, China, Indonesia, and India being sold in the U.S. at less than fair value. Giorgio accounted for approximately one half of total U.S. production, but was neither a Coalition member nor a petitioner. The International Trade Commission issued questionnaires to domestic producers, including Giorgio. Giorgio responded: “We take no position on Chile, China and Indonesia[.] We oppose the petition against India.” The Department of Commerce initiated an antidumping investigation, “on behalf of the domestic industry,” 19 U.S.C. 1673a(c)(4)(A)(i), noting that supporters of the petition accounted for over 50 percent of production of the domestic producers who expressed an opinion even if Giorgio’s position was not disregarded. Commerce found that dumping had occurred. The ITC determined that the domestic industry was materially injured; Commerce issued corresponding antidumping orders. Customs collected antidumping duties for distribution to “affected domestic producers.” Under the Byrd Amendment, an affected domestic producer “was a petitioner or interested party in support of the petition.” ITC rejected Giorgio’s request to be listed because Giorgio’s responses did not indicate support for the petition. Customs denied Giorgio’s claims for distributions. After the Federal Circuit upheld the Byrd Amendment against a facial First Amendment challenge, the Trade Court dismissed Giorgio’s suit, finding the support requirement constitutional under the standards governing commercial speech because it directly advanced the government’s substantial interest in preventing dumping. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Giorgio Foods, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Gordon Auto Body Parts, a Taiwanese company, was one of several early entrants into the U.S. market for replacement truck hoods. PBSI eventually entered the market for certain replacement hoods but found that it could not match the prices of Gordon and other Taiwanese firms, with which Gordon had participated in joint ventures. Believing that Gordon and the other firms were conspiring to drive it out of business with predatory prices, PBSI brought antitrust claims against Gordon. The district court granted Gordon summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that PBSI failed to make any showing that Gordon’s prices were below an appropriate measure of cost. View "Superior Prod. P'shp v. Gordon Auto Body Parts Co." on Justia Law

From 1987 to 2001, Bengis and Noll engaged in a scheme to harvest large quantities of South Coast and West Coast rock lobsters from South African waters for export to the United States in violation of both South African and U.S. law. Defendants, through their company, Hout Bay, harvested rock lobsters in amounts that exceeded the South African Department of Marine and Coastal Management’s quotas. In 2001, South Africa seized a container of unlawfully harvested lobsters, declined to prosecute the individuals, but charged Hout Bay with overfishing. Bengis pleaded guilty on behalf of Hout Bay. South Africa cooperated with a parallel investigation conducted by the United States. The two pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit smuggling and violate the Lacey Act, which prohibits trade in illegally taken fish and wildlife, and to substantive violations of the Lacey Act. Bengis pleaded guilty to conspiracy to violate the Lacey Act. The district court entered a restitution order requiring the defendants to pay $22,446,720 to South Africa. The Second Circuit affirmed, except with respect to the extent of Bengis’s liability, rejecting an argument the restitution order violated their Sixth Amendment rights. View "United States v. Bengis" on Justia Law

The Department of Commerce imposed both antidumping and countervailing duties on pneumatic tires from China under a 2012 law, 19 U.S.C. 1671, 1677f-1, that overruled the Federal Circuit’s 2011decision with respect to the same goods and permitted Commerce to impose countervailing duties with respect to non-market economy (NME) countries retroactively to proceedings initiated on or after November 20, 2006. When antidumping and countervailing duties imposed on the same goods double count for the same unfair trade advantage, the new law adjusts for double counting prospectively to proceedings initiated after March 13, 2012, but not retrospectively. The Court of International Trade upheld the decision. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Trade Court’s rejection of challenges to the new law on rehearing. The new law does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause or the Due Process Clause. View "GPX Int'l Tire Corp. v. United States" on Justia Law

Licensees entered into a licensing agreement with Safeblood Tech for the exclusive rights to market patented technology overseas. After learning that they could not register the patents in other countries, Licensees sued Safeblood for breach of contract and sued Safeblood, its officers, and patent inventor for fraud, constructive fraud, and violations of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (ADTPA), Ark. Code 4-88-101 to -115. The district court dismissed the fraud claims at summary judgment. The remaining claims proceeded to trial and a jury found for Licensees, awarding them $786,000 in contract damages and no damages for violations of the ADTPA. The district court awarded Licensees $144,150.40 in prejudgment interest. The Eighth Circuit reversed as to the common-law fraud claim and the award of prejudgment interest, but otherwise affirmed. Licensees produced sufficient evidence that the inventor made a false statement of fact; the district court did not abuse its discretion when it gave the jury a diminution-in-product-value instruction; and Licensees waived their inconsistent-verdict argument. View "Yazdianpour v. Safeblood Techs., Inc." on Justia Law