Justia International Trade Opinion Summaries

Motiva’s patent, issued in 2007 and titled “Human Movement Measurement System,” generally relates to a “system for ... testing and training a user to manipulate the position of ... transponders while being guided by interactive and sensory feedback . . . for the purpose of functional movement assessment for exercise and physical rehabilitation.” Motiva accused Nintendo’s Wii video game system of infringement. The district court stayed the case pending patent reexamination. Motiva then filed a complaint with the International Trade Commission, asserting that the Wii infringed the patent, so that its importation violated the Tariff Act. After the Commission began its investigation, Nintendo moved for summary determination under Section 337, which prohibits importation of articles that infringe a valid and enforceable U.S. patent if “an industry in the United States, relating to the articles protected by the patent ... exists or is in the process of being established.” 19 U.S.C. 1337(a)(2). According to Nintendo, there were no commercialized products incorporating Motiva’s patented technology, and Motiva’s activity aimed at developing a domestic industry consisted solely of the litigation. The administrative law judge agreed. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Motiva, LLC v. Int'l Trade Comm'n" on Justia Law

Deckers imported UGG® Classic Crochet boots having a knit upper portion and a rubber sole. They do not have laces, buckles, or fasteners, can be pulled on by hand, and extend above the ankle. At liquidation, Customs classified the boots under Subheading 19.35, covering: “Footwear with outer soles of rubber, plastics, leather or composition leather and uppers of textile materials: Footwear with outer soles of rubber or plastics: Other: Footwear with open toes or open heels; footwear of the slip-on type, that is held to the foot without the use of laces or buckles or other fasteners, the foregoing except footwear of subheading 6404.19.20 and except footwear having a foxing or foxing-like band wholly or almost wholly of rubber or plastics applied or molded at the sole and overlapping the upper” and subject to a duty rate of 37.5 percent. Deckers sought reclassification under subheading 6404.19.90, covering“[f]ootwear with outer soles of rubber . . . uppers of textile materials” that is “[v]alued [at] over $12/pair,” subject to a duty rate of nine percent. Customs rejected an argument that the term “footwear of the slip-on type” only encompasses footwear that does not extend above the ankle. The Trade Court granted the government summary judgment. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Deckers Outdoor Corp. v. United States" on Justia Law

U.S. Customs and Border Protection denied Ford’s claims for post-entry duty refunds. The Court of International Trade upheld the denial and the Federal Circuit vacated. While 19 U.S.C. 1520(d) required Ford to file the relevant certificates of origin within one year, and its failure to do so could not be excused by 19 C.F.R. 10.112, Customs failed to adequately explain why it treats post-entry claims for refunds under 1520(d) differently depending on whether they were filed on paper or through the reconciliation program, under the North American Free Trade Agreement, which allows qualifying goods to enter the United States duty free(art. 502). View "Ford Motor Co. v. United States" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration's recent authorization of a pilot program that allowed Mexico-domiciled trucking companies to operate trucks throughout the United States, so long as the trucking companies complied with certain federal safety standards. Drivers Association and Teamsters contended that the pilot program was unlawful. As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that Drivers Association and Teamsters both have standing to challenge the pilot program. On the merits, the court concluded that all seven of Drivers Association's arguments and all six of Teamsters' arguments were unpersuasive. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions for review. View "International Brotherhood of Teamsters, et al. v. DOT, et al." on Justia Law

In 2003, Russell, the sole occupant and pilot of an Agusta 109C helicopter, died after his helicopter crashed in Illinois. Russell, a resident of Georgia, was living in Illinois and working for an Illinois air ambulance service operating in the Chicago area. The helicopter was manufactured in Italy in 1989. The trial court dismissed claims against SNFA, a French company that manufactured a custom tail-rotor bearing for the helicopter, for lack of jurisdiction. The appellate court reversed and the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, noting that Agusta and its American subsidiary, AAC, effectively operated as an American distributor for the tail-rotor bearings in the U.S. market and that SNFA custom manufactured the bearings at issue specifically for Agusta. By engaging a business entity located in Illinois, SNFA undoubtedly benefitted from Illinois’ system of laws, infrastructure, and business climate and has the requisite minimum contacts with Illinois for purposes of specific personal jurisdiction. The exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable; Illinois has an indisputable interest in resolving litigation stemming from a fatal Illinois helicopter accident. View "Russell v. SNFA" on Justia Law

The U.S. Department of Commerce used a practice known as “zeroing” to determine antidumping duties in administrative reviews, even though Commerce no longer uses zeroing in investigations establishing antidumping orders. Using zeroing, negative dumping margins (margins of sales of merchandise sold at nondumped prices) are given a value of zero and only positive dumping margins (margins for sales of merchandise sold at dumped prices) are aggregated, to avoid a negative number that would offset a positive margin for another averaging group. The statute, 19 U.S.C. 1677(35)(A), does not mention zeroing. However, Commerce has emphasized language that the dumping margin “means the amount by which the normal value exceeds the export price or constructed export price of the subject merchandise.” Commerce attributes the differing interpretations as necessary to comply with international obligations, while preserving a practice that serves recognized policy goals. Following two remands, the Court of International Trade and Federal Circuit affirmed. No rule of law precludes Commerce from interpreting the statute differently in different circumstances as long as it provides an adequate explanation. View "Union Steel v. United States" on Justia Law

Kahrs imports engineered wood flooring panels for distribution to flooring wholesalers. Kahrs classified the products as “assembled parquet panels” under the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS) subheading 4418.30.00, a duty-free provision for “Builders’ joinery and carpentry of wood, including cellular wood panels and assembled parquet panels; shingles and shakes: parquet panels.” Customs subsequently liquidated Kahrs’ merchandise under HTSUS 4412, which covers “plywood, veneered panels and similar laminated wood,” at a duty rate of eight percent ad valorem. Customs denied a protest and the Court of International Trade found that Customs correctly classified Kahrs’ merchandise as plywood under heading 4412. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Kahrs Int'l, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Johnson Controls, a Wisconsin manufacturer of building management systems and HVAC equipment, and Edman Controls entered into an agreement giving Edman exclusive rights to distribute Johnson’s products in Panama. In 2009, Johnson breached the agreement by attempting to sell its products directly to Panamanian developers, circumventing Edman. Edman invoked the agreement’s arbitration clause. The arbitrator concluded that Johnson had breached the agreement and that Edman was entitled to damages. Johnson sought to vacate or modify the arbitral award, challenging the way in which the award took account of injuries to Edman’s subsidiaries and the arbitrator’s alleged refusal to follow Wisconsin law. The district court ruled in Edman’s favor. The Seventh Circuit affirmed and upheld the district court’s award of attorney fees. View "Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Edman Controls, Inc." on Justia Law

Shell imported petroleum products, 1993-1994, upon which custom duties, taxes, and other fees were paid. During the same period, Shell exported drawback-eligible substitute finished petroleum derivatives. In 1995-1996, substitution drawback claims were filed with the U.S. Customs and Border Protection on Shell’s behalf. Generally, Customs provides a drawback of 99% of any duty, tax, or fee imposed under federal law upon entry or importation if the merchandise (or a commercially interchangeable substitute) is subsequently exported or destroyed under Customs supervision and not used within the U.S. before exportation or destruction, 19 U.S.C. 1313(j),(p). Drawback claims must be filed within three years of exportation. During the time of Shell’s imports, drawback eligibility of Harbor Maintenance Tax and Environmental Tax payments, which Shell now seeks, were heavily disputed. Shell was found not to have included an express request for HMT and ET in the “net claim” figure. In 1997, after the three-year period for the filing of drawback claims had expired Shell filed protests with Customs, seeking drawback as to HMT and ET payments. Customs denied Shell’s protests. The Court of International Trade found the claims time-barred. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that 1999 and 2004 statutory amendments did not change Shell’s position.View "Shell Oil Co. v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2004 Ford owned the British car maker Jaguar. In 2004 and 2005, Ford imported Jaguar-brand cars. On the cars’ entry into the U. S., Ford deposited estimated duty payments with Customs. Ford subsequently concluded that its estimates were too high and filed reconciliation entries seeking a refund. The total refund claimed, across nine disputed entries at issue, was about $6.2 million. The general one-year time period imposed for liquidating such entries had long expired when Ford filed suit, 19 U.S.C. 1504(a). The Court of International Trade rejected the complaint’s assertion of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1581(i), the Tariff Act’s grant of residual jurisdiction over matters concerning enforcement and administration of duty assessment. The Federal Circuit reversed, finding valid invocation of the court’s residual jurisdiction, as the importer could not have asserted jurisdiction under any of the other enumerated provisions of section 1581. Post-complaint efforts by Customs to clear the importer’s accounts did not undo such jurisdiction.View "Ford Motor Co. v. United States" on Justia Law